nettle-bugs May 2021

nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se

4 participants
10 discussions

Add RSA-OAEP encryption/decryption to Nettle
by Nicolas Mora 09 Mar '24

09 Mar '24

Hello, I've made a new Merge Request in the nettle gitlab repo to provide RSA-OAEP encryption and decryption: https://git.lysator.liu.se/nettle/nettle/-/merge_requests/20 It adds 2 new functions: int pkcs1_oaep_encrypt (size_t key_size, void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, size_t hlen, size_t label_length, const uint8_t *label, size_t message_length, const uint8_t *message, mpz_t m); int pkcs1_oaep_decrypt (size_t key_size, const mpz_t m, size_t hlen, size_t label_length, const uint8_t *label, size_t *length, uint8_t *message); The parameter hlen is the output length of the SHA function used for masking data: - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE - SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE - SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE Is it possible to get feedback for this MR and eventually push it to the master branch? Thanks in advance /Nicolas

4 21

Curve point decompression
by Wim Lewis 10 Nov '21

10 Nov '21

I'm looking at implementing elliptic curve point compression a la SEC1 (admittedly, mostly to reduce the number of "feature not supported" code paths in a library, but it seems like a somewhat useful ability). Nettle/Hogweed already implements it internally for curve25519, but I want to implement it for the "secp" curves as well. Point compression is easy enough, but point decompression requires some curve math, potentially dependent on the specific curve, and some of it is redundant with what's already done in ecc_point_set(). So I was thinking about moving this functionality into Hogweed as a function along the lines of ecc_point_set_compressed(), which would take, instead of a y-coordinate, an int containing the sign/parity of the y-coordinate. So my question for the list and for the maintainers is, is this a reasonable API to add to Hogweed? Is there interest in including it in Hogweed if I were to take the time to turn it into a tidy patch?

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[S390x] Optimize AES modes
by Maamoun TK 19 Sep '21

19 Sep '21

I made a merge request for optimizing AES modes on s390x architecture, the patch implements the optimized cores using cipher instructions that have been added to s390x arch in message security assist extensions. The patch uses the following functions: KM-AES-128 (ECB-AES128) KM-AES-192 (ECB-AES192) KM-AES-256 (ECB-AES256) KMC-AES-128 (CBC-AES128) KMC-AES-192 (CBC-AES192) KMC-AES-256 (CBC-AES256) KMAC-AES-128 (CCM-AES128, CMAC-AES128) KMAC-AES-192 (CCM-AES192) KMAC-AES-256 (CCM-AES256, CMAC-AES256) KMF-AES-128 (CFB-AES128, CFB8-AES128) KMF-AES-192 (CFB-AES192, CFB8-AES192) KMF-AES-256 (CFB-AES256, CFB8-AES256) KM-XTS-AES-128 (XTS-AES128) KM-XTS-AES-256 (XTS-AES256) KIMD-GHASH (GHASH) KMCTR-AES-128, KMA-GCM-AES-128 (CTR-AES128) KMCTR-AES-192, KMA-GCM-AES-192 (CTR-AES192) KMCTR-AES-256, KMA-GCM-AES-256 (CTR-AES256) KMA-GCM-AES-128 (GCM-AES128) KMA-GCM-AES-192 (GCM-AES192) KMA-GCM-AES-256 (GCM-AES256) The merge request has also a benchmark that measures the speed of optimized cores on s390x arch. I can't set up gitlab CI for automatic testing on s390x arch because qemu hasn't implemented cipher functions for this arch. However, there is an easy way to test the patch manually by requesting a free account on the LinuxONE Community Cloud, both short-term and long-term access are available. https://linuxone.cloud.marist.edu/#/register?flag=VM regards, Mamone

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[Aarch64] Optimize AES
by Maamoun TK 17 Jul '21

17 Jul '21

This patch optimizes nettle_aes_encrypt() and nettle_aes_decrypt() functions for arm64 architecture, it takes advantage of 'aese' and 'aesmc' instructions to optimize the encryption function and 'aesd' and 'aesimc' to optimize the decryption function. The patch passes the testsuite of nettle. I also run the benchmark on gcc117 instance of CFarm by configuring the library with "--disable-fat --enable-arm64-crypto" options then executing examples/nettle-benchmark: aes128 ECB encrypt 2522.67 aes128 ECB decrypt 2522.53 aes192 ECB encrypt 2165.06 aes192 ECB decrypt 2165.04 aes256 ECB encrypt 1866.80 aes256 ECB decrypt 1866.38 openssl aes128 ECB encrypt 1043.52 openssl aes128 ECB decrypt 1043.05 openssl aes192 ECB encrypt 904.08 openssl aes192 ECB decrypt 903.85 openssl aes256 ECB encrypt 787.43 openssl aes256 ECB decrypt 787.20 gcm_aes128 encrypt 955.10 gcm_aes128 decrypt 955.06 gcm_aes128 update 3269.18 gcm_aes192 encrypt 896.26 gcm_aes192 decrypt 896.46 gcm_aes192 update 3270.24 gcm_aes256 encrypt 840.17 gcm_aes256 decrypt 843.53 gcm_aes256 update 3270.08 openssl gcm_aes128 encrypt 894.51 openssl gcm_aes128 decrypt 899.05 openssl gcm_aes128 update 1636.61 openssl gcm_aes192 encrypt 834.94 openssl gcm_aes192 decrypt 841.99 openssl gcm_aes192 update 1631.40 openssl gcm_aes256 encrypt 788.48 openssl gcm_aes256 decrypt 791.31 openssl gcm_aes256 update 1635.18 I'm a little suspicious about the benchmark numbers because as I remember the performance of gcm update doesn't double the openssl number, I repeat running the process but kept giving the same performance margin. --- arm64/crypto/aes-decrypt-internal.asm | 223 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arm64/crypto/aes-encrypt-internal.asm | 223 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 446 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arm64/crypto/aes-decrypt-internal.asm create mode 100644 arm64/crypto/aes-encrypt-internal.asm diff --git a/arm64/crypto/aes-decrypt-internal.asm b/arm64/crypto/aes-decrypt-internal.asm new file mode 100644 index 00000000..4bfdb314 --- /dev/null +++ b/arm64/crypto/aes-decrypt-internal.asm @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +C arm64/crypto/aes-decrypt-internal.asm + +ifelse(` + Copyright (C) 2021 Mamone Tarsha + This file is part of GNU Nettle. + + GNU Nettle is free software: you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of either: + + * the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or + + * the GNU General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or both in parallel, as here. + + GNU Nettle is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + General Public License for more details. + + You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License and + the GNU Lesser General Public License along with this program. If + not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. +') + +.file "aes-decrypt-internal.asm" +.arch armv8-a+crypto + +.text + +C Register usage: + +define(`ROUNDS', `x0') +define(`KEYS', `x1') +define(`LENGTH', `x3') +define(`DST', `x4') +define(`SRC', `x5') + +define(`S0', `v0') +define(`S1', `v1') +define(`S2', `v2') +define(`S3', `v3') +define(`K0', `v16') +define(`K1', `v17') +define(`K2', `v18') +define(`K3', `v19') +define(`K4', `v20') +define(`K5', `v21') +define(`K6', `v22') +define(`K7', `v23') +define(`K8', `v24') +define(`K9', `v25') +define(`K10', `v26') +define(`K11', `v27') +define(`K12', `v28') +define(`K13', `v29') +define(`K14', `v30') + +C AES_ROUND_4B(KEY) +define(`AES_ROUND_4B', m4_assert_numargs(1)` + aesd S0.16b,$1.16b + aesimc S0.16b,S0.16b + aesd S1.16b,$1.16b + aesimc S1.16b,S1.16b + aesd S2.16b,$1.16b + aesimc S2.16b,S2.16b + aesd S3.16b,$1.16b + aesimc S3.16b,S3.16b +') + +C AES_LAST_ROUND_4B(KEY) +define(`AES_LAST_ROUND_4B', m4_assert_numargs(1)` + aesd S0.16b,$1.16b + eor S0.16b,S0.16b,K14.16b + aesd S1.16b,$1.16b + eor S1.16b,S1.16b,K14.16b + aesd S2.16b,$1.16b + eor S2.16b,S2.16b,K14.16b + aesd S3.16b,$1.16b + eor S3.16b,S3.16b,K14.16b +') + +C AES_ROUND_1B(KEY) +define(`AES_ROUND_1B', m4_assert_numargs(1)` + aesd S0.16b,$1.16b + aesimc S0.16b,S0.16b +') + +C AES_LAST_ROUND_1B(KEY) +define(`AES_LAST_ROUND_1B', m4_assert_numargs(1)` + aesd S0.16b,$1.16b + eor S0.16b,S0.16b,K14.16b +') + +C _aes_decrypt(unsigned rounds, const uint32_t *keys, +C const struct aes_table *T, +C size_t length, uint8_t *dst, +C const uint8_t *src) + +PROLOGUE(_nettle_aes_decrypt) + ands x6,LENGTH,#-64 + b.eq L1B + + mov x7,KEYS + ld1 {K0.4s,K1.4s,K2.4s,K3.4s},[x7],#64 + ld1 {K4.4s,K5.4s,K6.4s,K7.4s},[x7],#64 + ld1 {K8.4s,K9.4s},[x7],#32 + cmp ROUNDS,#10 + b.eq L4B_last_key + ld1 {K10.4s,K11.4s},[x7],#32 + cmp ROUNDS,#12 + b.eq L4B_last_key + ld1 {K12.4s,K13.4s},[x7],#32 + +L4B_last_key: + ld1 {K14.4s},[x7] + +L4B_loop: + ld1 {S0.16b,S1.16b,S2.16b,S3.16b},[SRC],#64 + + AES_ROUND_4B(K0) + AES_ROUND_4B(K1) + AES_ROUND_4B(K2) + AES_ROUND_4B(K3) + AES_ROUND_4B(K4) + AES_ROUND_4B(K5) + AES_ROUND_4B(K6) + AES_ROUND_4B(K7) + AES_ROUND_4B(K8) + cmp ROUNDS,#10 + b.eq L4B_10_round + cmp ROUNDS,#12 + b.eq L4B_12_round + b L4B_14_round + +L4B_10_round: + AES_LAST_ROUND_4B(K9) + b L4B_done +L4B_12_round: + AES_ROUND_4B(K9) + AES_ROUND_4B(K10) + AES_LAST_ROUND_4B(K11) + b L4B_done +L4B_14_round: + AES_ROUND_4B(K9) + AES_ROUND_4B(K10) + AES_ROUND_4B(K11) + AES_ROUND_4B(K12) + AES_LAST_ROUND_4B(K13) + +L4B_done: + st1 {S0.16b,S1.16b,S2.16b,S3.16b},[DST],#64 + + subs x6,x6,#64 + b.ne L4B_loop + + and LENGTH,LENGTH,#63 + +L1B: + cbz LENGTH,Ldone + + mov x6,KEYS + ld1 {K0.4s,K1.4s,K2.4s,K3.4s},[x6],#64 + ld1 {K4.4s,K5.4s,K6.4s,K7.4s},[x6],#64 + ld1 {K8.4s,K9.4s},[x6],#32 + cmp ROUNDS,#10 + b.eq L1B_last_key + ld1 {K10.4s,K11.4s},[x6],#32 + cmp ROUNDS,#12 + b.eq L1B_last_key + ld1 {K12.4s,K13.4s},[x6],#32 + +L1B_last_key: + ld1 {K14.4s},[x6] + +L1B_loop: + ld1 {S0.16b},[SRC],#16 + + AES_ROUND_1B(K0) + AES_ROUND_1B(K1) + AES_ROUND_1B(K2) + AES_ROUND_1B(K3) + AES_ROUND_1B(K4) + AES_ROUND_1B(K5) + AES_ROUND_1B(K6) + AES_ROUND_1B(K7) + AES_ROUND_1B(K8) + cmp ROUNDS,#10 + b.eq L1B_10_round + cmp ROUNDS,#12 + b.eq L1B_12_round + b L1B_14_round + +L1B_10_round: + AES_LAST_ROUND_1B(K9) + b L1B_done +L1B_12_round: + AES_ROUND_1B(K9) + AES_ROUND_1B(K10) + AES_LAST_ROUND_1B(K11) + b L1B_done +L1B_14_round: + AES_ROUND_1B(K9) + AES_ROUND_1B(K10) + AES_ROUND_1B(K11) + AES_ROUND_1B(K12) + AES_LAST_ROUND_1B(K13) + +L1B_done: + st1 {S0.16b},[DST],#16 + + subs LENGTH,LENGTH,#16 + b.ne L1B_loop + +Ldone: + ret +EPILOGUE(_nettle_aes_decrypt) diff --git a/arm64/crypto/aes-encrypt-internal.asm b/arm64/crypto/aes-encrypt-internal.asm new file mode 100644 index 00000000..314f9333 --- /dev/null +++ b/arm64/crypto/aes-encrypt-internal.asm @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +C arm64/crypto/aes-encrypt-internal.asm + +ifelse(` + Copyright (C) 2021 Mamone Tarsha + This file is part of GNU Nettle. + + GNU Nettle is free software: you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of either: + + * the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or + + * the GNU General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or both in parallel, as here. + + GNU Nettle is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + General Public License for more details. + + You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License and + the GNU Lesser General Public License along with this program. If + not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. +') + +.file "aes-encrypt-internal.asm" +.arch armv8-a+crypto + +.text + +C Register usage: + +define(`ROUNDS', `x0') +define(`KEYS', `x1') +define(`LENGTH', `x3') +define(`DST', `x4') +define(`SRC', `x5') + +define(`S0', `v0') +define(`S1', `v1') +define(`S2', `v2') +define(`S3', `v3') +define(`K0', `v16') +define(`K1', `v17') +define(`K2', `v18') +define(`K3', `v19') +define(`K4', `v20') +define(`K5', `v21') +define(`K6', `v22') +define(`K7', `v23') +define(`K8', `v24') +define(`K9', `v25') +define(`K10', `v26') +define(`K11', `v27') +define(`K12', `v28') +define(`K13', `v29') +define(`K14', `v30') + +C AES_ROUND_4B(KEY) +define(`AES_ROUND_4B', m4_assert_numargs(1)` + aese S0.16b,$1.16b + aesmc S0.16b,S0.16b + aese S1.16b,$1.16b + aesmc S1.16b,S1.16b + aese S2.16b,$1.16b + aesmc S2.16b,S2.16b + aese S3.16b,$1.16b + aesmc S3.16b,S3.16b +') + +C AES_LAST_ROUND_4B(KEY) +define(`AES_LAST_ROUND_4B', m4_assert_numargs(1)` + aese S0.16b,$1.16b + eor S0.16b,S0.16b,K14.16b + aese S1.16b,$1.16b + eor S1.16b,S1.16b,K14.16b + aese S2.16b,$1.16b + eor S2.16b,S2.16b,K14.16b + aese S3.16b,$1.16b + eor S3.16b,S3.16b,K14.16b +') + +C AES_ROUND_1B(KEY) +define(`AES_ROUND_1B', m4_assert_numargs(1)` + aese S0.16b,$1.16b + aesmc S0.16b,S0.16b +') + +C AES_LAST_ROUND_1B(KEY) +define(`AES_LAST_ROUND_1B', m4_assert_numargs(1)` + aese S0.16b,$1.16b + eor S0.16b,S0.16b,K14.16b +') + +C _aes_encrypt(unsigned rounds, const uint32_t *keys, +C const struct aes_table *T, +C size_t length, uint8_t *dst, +C uint8_t *src) + +PROLOGUE(_nettle_aes_encrypt) + ands x6,LENGTH,#-64 + b.eq L1B + + mov x7,KEYS + ld1 {K0.4s,K1.4s,K2.4s,K3.4s},[x7],#64 + ld1 {K4.4s,K5.4s,K6.4s,K7.4s},[x7],#64 + ld1 {K8.4s,K9.4s},[x7],#32 + cmp ROUNDS,#10 + b.eq L4B_last_key + ld1 {K10.4s,K11.4s},[x7],#32 + cmp ROUNDS,#12 + b.eq L4B_last_key + ld1 {K12.4s,K13.4s},[x7],#32 + +L4B_last_key: + ld1 {K14.4s},[x7] + +L4B_loop: + ld1 {S0.16b,S1.16b,S2.16b,S3.16b},[SRC],#64 + + AES_ROUND_4B(K0) + AES_ROUND_4B(K1) + AES_ROUND_4B(K2) + AES_ROUND_4B(K3) + AES_ROUND_4B(K4) + AES_ROUND_4B(K5) + AES_ROUND_4B(K6) + AES_ROUND_4B(K7) + AES_ROUND_4B(K8) + cmp ROUNDS,#10 + b.eq L4B_10_round + cmp ROUNDS,#12 + b.eq L4B_12_round + b L4B_14_round + +L4B_10_round: + AES_LAST_ROUND_4B(K9) + b L4B_done +L4B_12_round: + AES_ROUND_4B(K9) + AES_ROUND_4B(K10) + AES_LAST_ROUND_4B(K11) + b L4B_done +L4B_14_round: + AES_ROUND_4B(K9) + AES_ROUND_4B(K10) + AES_ROUND_4B(K11) + AES_ROUND_4B(K12) + AES_LAST_ROUND_4B(K13) + +L4B_done: + st1 {S0.16b,S1.16b,S2.16b,S3.16b},[DST],#64 + + subs x6,x6,#64 + b.ne L4B_loop + + and LENGTH,LENGTH,#63 + +L1B: + cbz LENGTH,Ldone + + mov x6,KEYS + ld1 {K0.4s,K1.4s,K2.4s,K3.4s},[x6],#64 + ld1 {K4.4s,K5.4s,K6.4s,K7.4s},[x6],#64 + ld1 {K8.4s,K9.4s},[x6],#32 + cmp ROUNDS,#10 + b.eq L1B_last_key + ld1 {K10.4s,K11.4s},[x6],#32 + cmp ROUNDS,#12 + b.eq L1B_last_key + ld1 {K12.4s,K13.4s},[x6],#32 + +L1B_last_key: + ld1 {K14.4s},[x6] + +L1B_loop: + ld1 {S0.16b},[SRC],#16 + + AES_ROUND_1B(K0) + AES_ROUND_1B(K1) + AES_ROUND_1B(K2) + AES_ROUND_1B(K3) + AES_ROUND_1B(K4) + AES_ROUND_1B(K5) + AES_ROUND_1B(K6) + AES_ROUND_1B(K7) + AES_ROUND_1B(K8) + cmp ROUNDS,#10 + b.eq L1B_10_round + cmp ROUNDS,#12 + b.eq L1B_12_round + b L1B_14_round + +L1B_10_round: + AES_LAST_ROUND_1B(K9) + b L1B_done +L1B_12_round: + AES_ROUND_1B(K9) + AES_ROUND_1B(K10) + AES_LAST_ROUND_1B(K11) + b L1B_done +L1B_14_round: + AES_ROUND_1B(K9) + AES_ROUND_1B(K10) + AES_ROUND_1B(K11) + AES_ROUND_1B(K12) + AES_LAST_ROUND_1B(K13) + +L1B_done: + st1 {S0.16b},[DST],#16 + + subs LENGTH,LENGTH,#16 + b.ne L1B_loop + +Ldone: + ret +EPILOGUE(_nettle_aes_encrypt) -- 2.25.1

2 2

HPKE implementation
by Norbert Pocs 14 Jul '21

14 Jul '21

Hello mailing list, I am a student at Brno University of Technology at Faculty of Information Technology and intern at Red Hat Crypto team. My current project is the implementation of HPKE draft [0]. The first goal is to implement mode_base. Example usage for the project is the encrypted hello message in TLS [1]. Do you have interest in merging the code after completion? [0] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-07 [1] https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/issues/595 Regards Norbert Pócs

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[RFC PATCH 0/6] Introduce combined AES-GCM assembly for POWER9+
by Christopher M. Riedl 01 Jun '21

01 Jun '21

Hi! This series introduces a mechanism to support arch specific, combined AES+GCM {en,de}cryption functions. These functions are stubbed by default and will fall-back to the separate hash and crypt functions if no arch override exists. The arch override can be provided either at build time via appropriate config options or using the FAT runtime mechanism. An implementation combining AES+GCM _can potentially_ yield significant performance boosts by allowing for increased instruction parallelism, avoiding C-function call overhead, more flexibility in assembly fine-tuning, etc. This series provides such an implementation based on the existing optimized Nettle routines for POWER9 and later processors. Benchmark results on a POWER9 Blackbird running at 3.5GHz are given at the end of this mail. Both builds were configured statically ie. not FAT. FAT performance is slightly lower for both but shows similar gains with this series. The OpenSSL build is based on latest OpenSSL master with all PowerPC optimizations enabled. Note that the gains on an early POWER10 system are even more impressive but unfortunately I cannot share those results publically yet :( AES+GCM combined (this series) ------------------------------ Algorithm mode Mbyte/s gcm_aes128 encrypt 2567.62 gcm_aes128 decrypt 2582.32 gcm_aes128 update 7724.15 gcm_aes192 encrypt 2279.39 gcm_aes192 decrypt 2293.20 gcm_aes192 update 7724.41 gcm_aes256 encrypt 2054.09 gcm_aes256 decrypt 2061.25 gcm_aes256 update 7724.04 openssl gcm_aes128 encrypt 2336.93 openssl gcm_aes128 decrypt 2337.95 openssl gcm_aes128 update 6248.22 openssl gcm_aes192 encrypt 2113.93 openssl gcm_aes192 decrypt 2114.93 openssl gcm_aes192 update 6210.65 openssl gcm_aes256 encrypt 1936.95 openssl gcm_aes256 decrypt 1935.88 openssl gcm_aes256 update 6208.72 AES,GCM separate (nettle master) -------------------------------- Algorithm mode Mbyte/s gcm_aes128 encrypt 1418.66 gcm_aes128 decrypt 1418.97 gcm_aes128 update 7766.31 gcm_aes192 encrypt 1314.03 gcm_aes192 decrypt 1313.17 gcm_aes192 update 7760.23 gcm_aes256 encrypt 1218.75 gcm_aes256 decrypt 1218.64 gcm_aes256 update 7760.52 openssl gcm_aes128 encrypt 2324.70 openssl gcm_aes128 decrypt 2317.19 openssl gcm_aes128 update 6152.77 openssl gcm_aes192 encrypt 2102.99 openssl gcm_aes192 decrypt 2098.98 openssl gcm_aes192 update 6175.62 openssl gcm_aes256 encrypt 1925.85 openssl gcm_aes256 decrypt 1922.49 openssl gcm_aes256 update 6204.55 Christopher M. Riedl (6): gcm: Introduce gcm_aes_{de,en}crypt() ppc: Fix variable name for --enable-power-altivec ppc: Add FAT feature and config option for ISA 3.0 ppc: Add gcm_aes_encrypt() asm for ISA 3.0 (P9) ppc: Add gcm_aes_decrypt() asm for ISA 3.0 (P9) ppc: Enable gcm_aes_{de,en}crypt() FAT configure.ac | 19 +- fat-ppc.c | 45 ++ fat-setup.h | 6 + gcm-internal.h | 14 + gcm.c | 151 ++++++- powerpc64/fat/gcm-aes-decrypt.asm | 37 ++ powerpc64/fat/gcm-aes-encrypt.asm | 37 ++ powerpc64/p9/gcm-aes-decrypt.asm | 663 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ powerpc64/p9/gcm-aes-encrypt.asm | 666 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 1630 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 powerpc64/fat/gcm-aes-decrypt.asm create mode 100644 powerpc64/fat/gcm-aes-encrypt.asm create mode 100644 powerpc64/p9/gcm-aes-decrypt.asm create mode 100644 powerpc64/p9/gcm-aes-encrypt.asm -- 2.26.1

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[Aarch64] Optimize SHA1 Compress
by Maamoun TK 01 Jun '21

01 Jun '21

This patch optimizes SHA1 compress function for arm64 architecture by taking advantage of SHA-1 instructions of Armv8 crypto extension. The SHA-1 instructions: SHA1C: SHA1 hash update (choose) SHA1H: SHA1 fixed rotate SHA1M: SHA1 hash update (majority) SHA1P: SHA1 hash update (parity) SHA1SU0: SHA1 schedule update 0 SHA1SU1: SHA1 schedule update 1 The patch is based on sha1-arm.c - ARMv8 SHA extensions using C intrinsics of repository https://github.com/noloader/SHA-Intrinsics by Jeffrey Walton. The patch passes the testsuite of nettle library and the benchmark numbers are considerably improved but the performance of the overall sha1 hash function doesn't surpass the corresponding openssl numbers. Benchmark on gcc117 instance of CFarm before applying the patch: Algorithm mode Mbyte/s sha1 update 214.16 openssl sha1 update 849.44 hmac-sha1 64 bytes 61.69 hmac-sha1 256 bytes 131.50 hmac-sha1 1024 bytes 185.20 hmac-sha1 4096 bytes 204.55 hmac-sha1 single msg 210.97 Benchmark on gcc117 instance of CFarm after applying the patch: Algorithm mode Mbyte/s sha1 update 795.57 openssl sha1 update 849.25 hmac-sha1 64 bytes 167.65 hmac-sha1 256 bytes 408.24 hmac-sha1 1024 bytes 636.68 hmac-sha1 4096 bytes 739.42 hmac-sha1 single msg 775.89 --- arm64/crypto/sha1-compress.asm | 245 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arm64/machine.m4 | 7 ++ 2 files changed, 252 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arm64/crypto/sha1-compress.asm diff --git a/arm64/crypto/sha1-compress.asm b/arm64/crypto/sha1-compress.asm new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bb3f1d35 --- /dev/null +++ b/arm64/crypto/sha1-compress.asm @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@ +C arm64/crypto/sha1-compress.asm + +ifelse(` + Copyright (C) 2021 Mamone Tarsha + + Based on sha1-arm.c - ARMv8 SHA extensions using C intrinsics of + repository https://github.com/noloader/SHA-Intrinsics + sha1-arm.c is written and placed in public domain by Jeffrey Walton, + based on code from ARM, and by Johannes Schneiders, Skip + Hovsmith and Barry O'Rourke for the mbedTLS project. + + This file is part of GNU Nettle. + + GNU Nettle is free software: you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of either: + + * the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or + + * the GNU General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or both in parallel, as here. + + GNU Nettle is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + General Public License for more details. + + You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License and + the GNU Lesser General Public License along with this program. If + not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. +') + +.file "sha1-compress.asm" +.arch armv8-a+crypto + +.text + +C Register usage: + +define(`STATE', `x0') +define(`INPUT', `x1') + +define(`CONST0', `v0') +define(`CONST1', `v1') +define(`CONST2', `v2') +define(`CONST3', `v3') +define(`MSG0', `v4') +define(`MSG1', `v5') +define(`MSG2', `v6') +define(`MSG3', `v7') +define(`ABCD', `v16') +define(`ABCD_SAVED', `v17') +define(`E0', `v18') +define(`E0_SAVED', `v19') +define(`E1', `v20') +define(`TMP0', `v21') +define(`TMP1', `v22') + +C void nettle_sha1_compress(uint32_t *state, const uint8_t *input) + +PROLOGUE(nettle_sha1_compress) + C Initialize constants + mov w2,#0x7999 + movk w2,#0x5A82,lsl #16 + dup CONST0.4s,w2 + mov w2,#0xEBA1 + movk w2,#0x6ED9,lsl #16 + dup CONST1.4s,w2 + mov w2,#0xBCDC + movk w2,#0x8F1B,lsl #16 + dup CONST2.4s,w2 + mov w2,#0xC1D6 + movk w2,#0xCA62,lsl #16 + dup CONST3.4s,w2 + + C Load state + add x2,STATE,#16 + movi E0.4s,#0 + ld1 {ABCD.4s},[STATE] + ld1 {E0.s}[0],[x2] + + C Save state + mov ABCD_SAVED.16b,ABCD.16b + mov E0_SAVED.16b,E0.16b + + C Load message + ld1 {MSG0.16b,MSG1.16b,MSG2.16b,MSG3.16b},[INPUT] + + C Reverse for little endian + rev32 MSG0.16b,MSG0.16b + rev32 MSG1.16b,MSG1.16b + rev32 MSG2.16b,MSG2.16b + rev32 MSG3.16b,MSG3.16b + + add TMP0.4s,MSG0.4s,CONST0.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG1.4s,CONST0.4s + + C Rounds 0-3 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1c QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG2.4s,CONST0.4s + sha1su0 MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s + + C Rounds 4-7 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1c QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG3.4s,CONST0.4s + sha1su1 MSG0.4s,MSG3.4s + sha1su0 MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s,MSG3.4s + + C Rounds 8-11 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1c QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG0.4s,CONST0.4s + sha1su1 MSG1.4s,MSG0.4s + sha1su0 MSG2.4s,MSG3.4s,MSG0.4s + + C Rounds 12-15 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1c QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG1.4s,CONST1.4s + sha1su1 MSG2.4s,MSG1.4s + sha1su0 MSG3.4s,MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s + + C Rounds 16-19 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1c QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG2.4s,CONST1.4s + sha1su1 MSG3.4s,MSG2.4s + sha1su0 MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s + + C Rounds 20-23 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG3.4s,CONST1.4s + sha1su1 MSG0.4s,MSG3.4s + sha1su0 MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s,MSG3.4s + + C Rounds 24-27 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG0.4s,CONST1.4s + sha1su1 MSG1.4s,MSG0.4s + sha1su0 MSG2.4s,MSG3.4s,MSG0.4s + + C Rounds 28-31 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG1.4s,CONST1.4s + sha1su1 MSG2.4s,MSG1.4s + sha1su0 MSG3.4s,MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s + + C Rounds 32-35 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG2.4s,CONST2.4s + sha1su1 MSG3.4s,MSG2.4s + sha1su0 MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s + + C Rounds 36-39 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG3.4s,CONST2.4s + sha1su1 MSG0.4s,MSG3.4s + sha1su0 MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s,MSG3.4s + + C Rounds 40-43 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1m QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG0.4s,CONST2.4s + sha1su1 MSG1.4s,MSG0.4s + sha1su0 MSG2.4s,MSG3.4s,MSG0.4s + + C Rounds 44-47 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1m QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG1.4s,CONST2.4s + sha1su1 MSG2.4s,MSG1.4s + sha1su0 MSG3.4s,MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s + + C Rounds 48-51 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1m QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG2.4s,CONST2.4s + sha1su1 MSG3.4s,MSG2.4s + sha1su0 MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s + + C Rounds 52-55 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1m QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG3.4s,CONST3.4s + sha1su1 MSG0.4s,MSG3.4s + sha1su0 MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s,MSG3.4s + + C Rounds 56-59 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1m QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG0.4s,CONST3.4s + sha1su1 MSG1.4s,MSG0.4s + sha1su0 MSG2.4s,MSG3.4s,MSG0.4s + + C Rounds 60-63 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG1.4s,CONST3.4s + sha1su1 MSG2.4s,MSG1.4s + sha1su0 MSG3.4s,MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s + + C Rounds 64-67 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + add TMP0.4s,MSG2.4s,CONST3.4s + sha1su1 MSG3.4s,MSG2.4s + sha1su0 MSG0.4s,MSG1.4s,MSG2.4s + + C Rounds 68-71 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + add TMP1.4s,MSG3.4s,CONST3.4s + sha1su1 MSG0.4s,MSG3.4s + + C Rounds 72-75 + sha1h SFP(E1),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E0),TMP0.4s + + C Rounds 76-79 + sha1h SFP(E0),SFP(ABCD) + sha1p QFP(ABCD),SFP(E1),TMP1.4s + + C Combine state + add E0.4s,E0.4s,E0_SAVED.4s + add ABCD.4s,ABCD.4s,ABCD_SAVED.4s + + C Store state + st1 {ABCD.4s},[STATE] + st1 {E0.s}[0],[x2] + + ret +EPILOGUE(nettle_sha1_compress) diff --git a/arm64/machine.m4 b/arm64/machine.m4 index e69de29b..7df62bcc 100644 --- a/arm64/machine.m4 +++ b/arm64/machine.m4 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +C Get 32-bit floating-point register from vector register +C SFP(VR) +define(`SFP',``s'substr($1,1,len($1))') + +C Get 128-bit floating-point register from vector register +C QFP(VR) +define(`QFP',``q'substr($1,1,len($1))') -- 2.25.1

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Add AES Key Wrap (RFC 3394) in Nettle
by Nicolas Mora 23 May '21

23 May '21

Hello, I've added a merge request to implement AES key wrap and unwrap in Nettle [1]. The MR is not complete, because the tests haven't been pushed yet and the documentation is missing, but if the new functionality is welcome to Nettle, I'd rather have some feedback on the code first, to make sure it respects the project guidelines. I can add tests based on the tests vectors in the RFC [2], but I'm not sure how the test suites are build, should I need to create test_wrap functions like in aes-test.c or something else? Thanks in advance for your help! /Nicolas [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394 [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394#section-4

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Re: [S390x] Optimize AES modes
by Maamoun TK 22 May '21

22 May '21

Hi, Niels Did you get the credentials of the new VM? I'm thinking after adding the address and ssh key of new VM, we can't get the optimized cores of AES tested since enable-msa isn't triggered. We need to push some sort of hard-coded option in configure.ac to get it tested in the VM during ci job. regards, Mamone On Mon, May 10, 2021 at 6:13 PM Niels Möller <nisse(a)lysator.liu.se> wrote: > David Edelsohn <dje.gcc(a)gmail.com> writes: > > > They are going to create a new VM on a separate Open Source Software > > Cloud for long-term projects. They will contact you directly with the > > credentials. > > Sounds good. Thanks for the update. > > Regards, > /Niels > > -- > Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid 368C6677. > Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance. >

2 3

Re: [S390x] Optimize AES modes
by Maamoun TK 10 May '21

10 May '21

I made a new merge request to s390x branch Add AES API for CBC mode (!24) · Merge requests · Nettle / nettle · GitLab (liu.se) <https://git.lysator.liu.se/nettle/nettle/-/merge_requests/24> This api is required to handle the optimized CBC cores which will be added later. regards, Mamone

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nettle-bugs May 2021