nettle-bugs

nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se

2 participants
2220 discussions

Vulnerability Report
by Feng Li 08 Aug '26

08 Aug '26

Dear Nettle maintainers, We have identified a security issue in Nettle’s GCM implementation. An adversary can exploit this to recover the authentication subkey H and forge arbitrary messages with valid tags. We provide the detail below. Recall GCM: Given: Key K, Nonce IV, Plaintext P, Additional authenticated data A Step 1. Compute the subkey H: H = AES_K(0^128). Step 2. Compute the initial counter block J0: If len(IV) == 96 bits: J0 = IV||0^31||1 Else: s = 128 * ceil(len(IV)/128) - len(IV) J0 = GHASH_H(IV||0^(s+64)||[len(IV)]_64) where [len(IV)]_64 is the 64-bit big‑endian representation of the bit length of IV. Step 3. Generate the keystream: The counter blocks are inc_32(J0), inc_32(inc_32(J0)), ... where inc_32 increments the lowest 32 bits modulo 2^32. Each counter block is encrypted with AES under key K to produce the keystream blocks. The plaintext blocks are XORed with the keystream blocks to obtain ciphertext C. Step 4. Compute the authentication tag: S = GHASH_H( A||C||[len(A)]_64||[len(C)]_64 ), T = S XOR AES_K(J0). What happens when the nonce (IV) is empty (Corresponding to this part of the code https://github.com/gnutls/nettle/blob/master/gcm.c ). let len(IV) = 0 bits. Step 1. H = AES_K(0^128) Step 2. Compute J0: s = 128 * ceil(0/128) - 0 = 0 The input to GHASH is: IV||0^(s+64)||[len(IV)]_64 = (empty)||0^64||0^64 = 0^128. So J0 = GHASH_H(0^128) = 0^128. (The GHASH accumulator starts at zero, XOR with the zero block remains zero, then multiply by H gives zero. So GHASH_H(0^128) = 0^128.) Step 4. Authentication tag: The mask used to XOR the GHASH result is AES_K(J0) = AES_K(0^128). But by definition this is exactly H. Therefore: T = S XOR H (where S = GHASH_H(A||C||length block)). This equation contains only one unknown variable: H. All other values (A, C, lenblock, T) are known to an attacker. Now, GHASH_H is a polynomial function in H over GF(2^128). For m blocks of input (A, C, and the length block), the GHASH result can be expressed as: S = B1 * H^m XOR B2 * H^(m-1) XOR ... XOR Bm * H where the B_i are known from the input blocks. Therefore the tag equation becomes: B1 * H^m XOR B2 * H^(m-1) XOR ... XOR (Bm XOR 1) * H XOR T = 0. This is a polynomial equation of degree m in H over the finite field GF(2^128). Once the attacker recovers H, they have the authentication subkey. They can now compute valid GHASH for any chosen A' and C' and generate a valid tag for any forged message: T' = GHASH_H(A'||C'||lenblock) XOR H. We suggest following the NIST standard and prohibiting an empty IV. Sincerely, Feng Li and Yaobin Shen

2 2

Return value from SLH-DSA signing functions?
by Niels Möller 26 Jun '26

26 Jun '26

In a different thread, I wrote: > (Somewhat related: I just realized that the slh-dsa signing functions > hit an assertion failure if public and private keys don't match. I think > it may be useful with an alternative signing function with a > success/fail return value). This isn't good; having asserts triggered by invalid input is ok only when inputs are invalid in a way that is (1) documented and (2) easy to check for at the call site. What happens is that creating an SLH-DSA signature will more or less for free recompute the top-level Merkle tree root hash, which is one of the pieces of the public key. So it's easy to compare them. If the two values differ, then either the private or public key doesn't match, or there's a bug in nettle, or there's some miscomputation, possibly caused by some fault injection attack. At least for some applications, it makes sense to always verify that a computed signature is valid before passing it on. This is pretty important, e.g., if using RSA in a setting where fault injection attacks are relevant, and some of Nettle' too many RSA signing functions have a check for that. As far as I understand, SLH-DSA is not that vulnerable to fault injection, but it may still be good practice to check that a computed signature is valid, in particular if one gets it for free when signing. So the options I see: 1. Keep assert, let it be caller's responsibilty to make sure that the public and private keys passed to the signing function are consistent. 2. Just delete the assert. 3. Drop the assert, but instead introduce a success/fail return value. Applications that care can check that; if one believes fault injection and the like isn't a relevant threat to one's application or to SLH-DSA in general, it seems fine to ignore the return value. 4. Have two flavors of signing functions, one with the assert, one with the return value. Any opinions? I'm currently leaning towards (3). In principle, changing return type from void to int is an ABI change, but I'm not aware of any platform where it actually is an ABI breakage. Regards, /Niels -- Niels Möller. PGP key CB4962D070D77D7FCB8BA36271D8F1FF368C6677. Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.

3 7

ML-KEM
by Niels Möller 04 Jun '26

04 Jun '26

Hi, I've now merge Daiki's ML-KEM implementation, see https://git.lysator.liu.se/nettle/nettle/-/merge_requests/67. I think there's some further changes I think I'd like to do before release: 1. Add more randomized tests, and add assert_maybe for some of the invariants, in particular for arithmetics. 2. Probably remove the ml_kem_params from the api, and instead use separate functions for ML-KEM 768 and ML-KEM 1024. 3. Add functions exposing structs for expanded keys. To avoid having to expand them over and over again if using the same key repeatedly. And for all-in-one functions, these structs could also be used as the types for needed scratch space, to make things a bit more type/alignment safe, and have a natural way to allocate needed storage without the _itch functions. Should then be done in a consistent way also for sntrup. (The reason sntrup api doesn't have any itch function is that its expanded keys are smaller, and it's more reasonable to just allocate them on the stack). 4. Micro optimize various internals. Regards, /Niels -- Niels Möller. PGP key CB4962D070D77D7FCB8BA36271D8F1FF368C6677. Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.

1 0

[PATCH] Annotate non-zero-terminated character arrays
by nettle＠gms.tf 17 May '26

17 May '26

From: Georg Sauthoff <mail(a)gms.tf> This fixes -Wunterminated-string-initialization warnings with gcc 15.2.1. --- aclocal.m4 | 7 +++++++ base16-encode.c | 2 +- base64-encode.c | 2 +- base64url-encode.c | 2 +- blowfish-bcrypt.c | 2 +- tools/pkcs1-conv.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/aclocal.m4 b/aclocal.m4 index 73bf0cfb..9f943b45 100644 --- a/aclocal.m4 +++ b/aclocal.m4 @@ -73,6 +73,13 @@ AH_BOTTOM( # define PRINTF_STYLE(f, a) # define UNUSED #endif +#ifdef __has_attribute +# if __has_attribute(nonstring) +# define NONSTRING __attribute__((__nonstring__)) +# else +# define NONSTRING +# endif +#endif ])]) # Check for alloca, and include the standard blurb in config.h diff --git a/base16-encode.c b/base16-encode.c index 9c7f0b1e..c6a4c6b9 100644 --- a/base16-encode.c +++ b/base16-encode.c @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static const uint8_t -hex_digits[16] = "0123456789abcdef"; +hex_digits[16] NONSTRING = "0123456789abcdef"; #define DIGIT(x) (hex_digits[(x) & 0xf]) diff --git a/base64-encode.c b/base64-encode.c index ee1ec149..6bb55782 100644 --- a/base64-encode.c +++ b/base64-encode.c @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ encode_raw(const char *alphabet, assert(out == dst); } -static const char base64_encode_table[64] = +static const char base64_encode_table[64] NONSTRING = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" "0123456789+/"; diff --git a/base64url-encode.c b/base64url-encode.c index d30044ea..2b78a800 100644 --- a/base64url-encode.c +++ b/base64url-encode.c @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void base64url_encode_init(struct base64_encode_ctx *ctx) { - static const char base64url_encode_table[64] = + static const char base64url_encode_table[64] NONSTRING = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" "0123456789-_"; diff --git a/blowfish-bcrypt.c b/blowfish-bcrypt.c index 385503ac..0326f1ff 100644 --- a/blowfish-bcrypt.c +++ b/blowfish-bcrypt.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static const signed char radix64_decode_table[0x100] = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, }; -static const char radix64_encode_table[64] = +static const char radix64_encode_table[64] NONSTRING = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" "0123456789"; diff --git a/tools/pkcs1-conv.c b/tools/pkcs1-conv.c index f6b044d2..68bb67d1 100644 --- a/tools/pkcs1-conv.c +++ b/tools/pkcs1-conv.c @@ -117,13 +117,13 @@ read_file(struct nettle_buffer *buffer, FILE *f) } static const uint8_t -pem_start_pattern[11] = "-----BEGIN "; +pem_start_pattern[11] NONSTRING = "-----BEGIN "; static const uint8_t -pem_end_pattern[9] = "-----END "; +pem_end_pattern[9] NONSTRING = "-----END "; static const uint8_t -pem_trailer_pattern[5] = "-----"; +pem_trailer_pattern[5] NONSTRING = "-----"; static const char pem_ws[33] = { -- 2.53.0

4 11

sntrup761
by Niels Möller 08 May '26

08 May '26

Hi, I'm having a new look at sntrup761, I have rebased the branch based on Simon's work, and pushed as branch "sntrup761" in the Nettle repository. And I've reread https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/nist/ntruprime-20201007.pdf (is that still the main spec?). I've also added valgrind-based tests for side-channels. It appears key generation may have leaks (when I mark the output from the randomness generator as secret). Maybe this is just rejection of certain samples, which should not be a problem (for this sampling strategy, it's expected to leak the number of tries needed). Encapsulation appears to not have branches or memory accesses depending on the randomness input. Decapsulation appears to have no branches or memory accesses depending on the secret key, which is the most important property. I don't yet quite understand the implementation. Some issues: * Not entirely sure where the sorting comes from (I saw no mention of it in the spec). I imagine it's part of generating random values of the appropriate types. * The encode/decode step appear to follow the spec closely, but to me it's a bit weird to use the M arrays filled with constant values. * Coding style is a bit odd, e.g., with long long type for values that always appear to always be small constant, short lowercase names like "p" used for preprocessor constants. I think it should be doable to get into good shape. Regards, /Niels -- Niels Möller. PGP key CB4962D070D77D7FCB8BA36271D8F1FF368C6677. Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.

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[PATCH] Synchronize func signatures between code and docs
by nettle＠gms.tf 12 Apr '26

12 Apr '26

From: Georg Sauthoff <mail(a)gms.tf> This mostly affects function signatures in the manual, i.e. to reflect prior code changes where e.g. uint8_t pointers were corrected to char pointers. NB, this change is limited to the base64/base16 functions, deviations in other translation units can be addressed with follow-up patches. --- base64.h | 5 +++-- nettle.texinfo | 18 +++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/base64.h b/base64.h index 3a31699e..d1ca61ad 100644 --- a/base64.h +++ b/base64.h @@ -100,7 +100,8 @@ base64_encode_update(struct base64_encode_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *src); /* DST should point to an area of size at least - * BASE64_ENCODE_FINAL_LENGTH */ + * BASE64_ENCODE_FINAL_LENGTH + * The return value is the number of output bytes generated. */ size_t base64_encode_final(struct base64_encode_ctx *ctx, char *dst); @@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ base64_decode_single(struct base64_decode_ctx *ctx, /* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error. DST should point to an area of * size *DST_LENGTH. Decoding returns failure it output would exceed - * this size. BASE64_DECODE_LENGTH(length) is always sufficient. + * this size. BASE64_DECODE_LENGTH(src_length) is always sufficient. * *DST_LENGTH is updated to reflect the amount of data actually * generated. */ int diff --git a/nettle.texinfo b/nettle.texinfo index 59a395da..50b14072 100644 --- a/nettle.texinfo +++ b/nettle.texinfo @@ -6333,7 +6333,7 @@ alphabet. @end deftypefun -@deftypefun {size_t} base64_encode_single (struct base64_encode_ctx *@var{ctx}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, uint8_t @var{src}) +@deftypefun {size_t} base64_encode_single (struct base64_encode_ctx *@var{ctx}, char *@var{dst}, uint8_t @var{src}) Encodes a single byte. Returns amount of output (always 1 or 2). @end deftypefun @@ -6342,7 +6342,7 @@ The maximum number of output bytes when passing @var{length} input bytes to @code{base64_encode_update}. @end deffn -@deftypefun {size_t} base64_encode_update (struct base64_encode_ctx *@var{ctx}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, size_t @var{length}, const uint8_t *@var{src}) +@deftypefun {size_t} base64_encode_update (struct base64_encode_ctx *@var{ctx}, char *@var{dst}, size_t @var{length}, const uint8_t *@var{src}) After @var{ctx} is initialized, this function may be called to encode @var{length} bytes from @var{src}. The result will be placed in @var{dst}, and the return value will be the number of bytes generated. Note that @var{dst} must be at least of size @@ -6353,7 +6353,7 @@ BASE64_ENCODE_LENGTH(@var{length}). The maximum amount of output from @code{base64_encode_final}. @end defvr -@deftypefun {size_t} base64_encode_final (struct base64_encode_ctx *@var{ctx}, uint8_t *@var{dst}) +@deftypefun {size_t} base64_encode_final (struct base64_encode_ctx *@var{ctx}, char *@var{dst}) After calling base64_encode_update one or more times, this function should be called to generate the final output bytes, including any needed paddding. The return value is the number of output bytes @@ -6371,7 +6371,7 @@ base64 alphabet, while @code{base64url_decode_init} selects the URL safe alphabet. @end deftypefun -@deftypefun {int} base64_decode_single (struct base64_decode_ctx *@var{ctx}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, uint8_t @var{src}) +@deftypefun {int} base64_decode_single (struct base64_decode_ctx *@var{ctx}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, char @var{src}) Decodes a single byte (@var{src}) and stores the result in @var{dst}. Returns amount of output (0 or 1), or -1 on errors. @end deftypefun @@ -6381,7 +6381,7 @@ The maximum number of output bytes when passing @var{length} input bytes to @code{base64_decode_update}. @end deffn -@deftypefun {void} base64_decode_update (struct base64_decode_ctx *@var{ctx}, size_t *@var{dst_length}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, size_t @var{src_length}, const uint8_t *@var{src}) +@deftypefun {int} base64_decode_update (struct base64_decode_ctx *@var{ctx}, size_t *@var{dst_length}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, size_t @var{src_length}, const char *@var{src}) After @var{ctx} is initialized, this function may be called to decode @var{src_length} bytes from @var{src}. The buffer pointed to by @var{dst} must be of size *@var{dst_length}, and the amount of data @@ -6400,7 +6400,7 @@ Similarly to the base64 functions, the following functions perform base16 encodi and are defined in @file{<nettle/base16.h>}. Note that there is no encoding context necessary for doing base16 encoding. -@deftypefun {void} base16_encode_single (uint8_t *@var{dst}, uint8_t @var{src}) +@deftypefun {void} base16_encode_single (char *@var{dst}, uint8_t @var{src}) Encodes a single byte. Always stores two digits in @var{dst}[0] and @var{dst}[1]. @end deftypefun @@ -6409,7 +6409,7 @@ The number of output bytes when passing @var{length} input bytes to @code{base16_encode_update}. @end deffn -@deftypefun {void} base16_encode_update (uint8_t *@var{dst}, size_t @var{length}, const uint8_t *@var{src}) +@deftypefun {void} base16_encode_update (char *@var{dst}, size_t @var{length}, const uint8_t *@var{src}) Always stores BASE16_ENCODE_LENGTH(@var{length}) digits in @var{dst}. @end deftypefun @@ -6421,7 +6421,7 @@ Initializes a base16 decoding context. This is necessary before starting a decod session. @end deftypefun -@deftypefun {int} base16_decode_single (struct base16_decode_ctx *@var{ctx}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, uint8_t @var{src}) +@deftypefun {int} base16_decode_single (struct base16_decode_ctx *@var{ctx}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, char @var{src}) Decodes a single byte from @var{src} into @var{dst}. Returns amount of output (0 or 1), or -1 on errors. @end deftypefun @@ -6430,7 +6430,7 @@ The maximum number of output bytes when passing @var{length} input bytes to @code{base16_decode_update}. @end deffn -@deftypefun {int} base16_decode_update (struct base16_decode_ctx *@var{ctx}, size_t *@var{dst_length}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, size_t @var{src_length}, const uint8_t *@var{src}) +@deftypefun {int} base16_decode_update (struct base16_decode_ctx *@var{ctx}, size_t *@var{dst_length}, uint8_t *@var{dst}, size_t @var{src_length}, const char *@var{src}) After @var{ctx} is initialized, this function may be called to decode @var{src_length} bytes from @var{src}. The buffer pointed to by @var{dst} must be of size *@var{dst_length}, and the amount of data -- 2.53.0

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The public key input for ed25519 sign
by Niels Möller 23 Mar '26

23 Mar '26

Hi, I've received a bug report pointing out that misuse of the public key input to ed25519_sha512_sign (and ed448_shake256_sign) is dangerous: If you sign the same message twice using the same private key, but the public key inputs differ, that can be exploited to recover the private key from the two signatures, similar to a classic DSA nonce reuse. If we compare to how others are dealing with this, a similar issue was considered a bug in a Rust library (see https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0093.html). On the other end, we have the Golang standard library that represents an ed25519 private key as 64 bytes where the first half are the private key according to RFC 8032, and the second half are the private key. This is motivated by performance, see https://pkg.go.dev/crypto/ed25519. Some options: 1. Document clearer that the public key argument *must* be the value produced by ed25519_sha512_public_key (e.g., immediately before the signing operation, or computed at key generation time and stored securely bundled with the private key). Pro: Small change, flexible. Cons: Leaves the possibility for applications to shoot themselves in the feet in this way. 2. Make ed25519_sha512_sign check that the signature is valid, essentially, adding an assert (ed25519_sha512_verify (...)) before returning. Pro: Could catch a range of potential bugs and attacks. Cons: Much worse signing performance. Also, avoiding the particular attack reported now depends on the verify operation enforcing canonical representation of the public key. 3. Drop the public key input argument, recompute it for each signing operation. Pro: Simpler interface, closer to RFC 8032. Cons: Much worse signing performance (but probably not as bad as option (2)). And one would have to think about backwards compatibility. Note that both (2) and (3) can be implemented as simple wrappers around the current signing function, for applications that are prepared to accept the performance penalty. Opinions? I'm leaning towards (1). Regards, /Niels PS. The reason this is an issue at all is that the public key is hashed together with the message in step 4 of the signing operation (see RFC 8032 5.1.6), but not in step 2. I imagine including the public key was considered to bring some subtle advantage in security; but maybe this should have been weighted differently against the additional api complexity in making an additional public key input highly desirable for performance. -- Niels Möller. PGP key CB4962D070D77D7FCB8BA36271D8F1FF368C6677. Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.

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ANNOUNCE: nettle-4.0
by Niels Möller 15 Feb '26

15 Feb '26

I'm happy to announce a new major release of GNU Nettle, a low-level cryptographics library. This release includes a couple of API changes, a few of which are rather disruptive, as well as deletion of obsolete features. There's only one notable new feature: Support for SLH-DSA signatures (stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm). Please review NEWS (see below) carefully before upgrading. Since upgrading requires application code changes, nettle-3 (latest version 3.10.2) will get bug fix releases as needed to fix any severe bugs found, until the dust has settled and users, applications and distros have had reasonable time to upgrade. The Nettle home page can be found at https://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/nettle/, and the manual at https://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/nettle/nettle.html. The release can be downloaded from https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/nettle/nettle-4.0.tar.gz https://www.lysator.liu.se/~nisse/archive/nettle-4.0.tar.gz Happy hacking, /Niels Möller NEWS for the Nettle 4.0 release This is a new major release. It includes one new feature, support for SLH-DSA. There are several changes to Nettle's API, as well as deletion of obsolete features. There are also several improvements to the ABI that leaves the API mostly unchanged, in particular, smaller context structs for several algorithms. The most disruptive API change is that the *_digest functions no longer takes the desired digest size as argument. Truncated hashes appeared to be an important use case decades ago when the previous interface was designed, but that is now rather obscure. Feedback on the new interfaces is appreciated, e.g., if the variable tag length for OCB and CCM should be supported differently, if additional types would benefit from larger alignment, or if there are remaining interface bugs or inconsistencies. Smaller additional API or ABI changes may be considered for the next release, Nettle-4.1, but after that, the intention is that both ABI and API should stay backwards compatible for a longer time. The shared library names are libnettle.so.9.0 and libhogweed.so.7.0, with new sonames libnettle.so.9 and libhogweed.so.7. Interface changes: * The _digest functions for hash algorithms, MACs and AEADs no longer take the desired digest size as argument, instead, they always produce the full-size digest. The typedef nettle_hash_digest_func has also been changed accordingly. There are two exceptions: CCM and OCB. These AEAD algorithms are specified with a variable tag length, which is not a mere truncation of the output. Their _digest functions (ccm_digest, ocb_digest, ccm_ae128_digest, ...) also have their length argument deleted, but they still produce a variable size digest. The number of octets to write (at most 16) is stored into the context struct by the corresponding _set_nonce function. * The functions to process complete messages using CCM AES now take a const cipher context as the first argument, e.g, first argument to ccm_aes128_encrypt_message is now a const struct aes128_ctx *. It used to be a struct ccm_aes128_ctx *, where everything but the underlying cipher context was ignored. * The SHA3 functions now use the same struct sha3_ctx for all flavors, and the same function sha3_init. Old names, e.g., sha3_256_ctx and sha3_256_init, are defined as preprocessor aliases, for backwards compatibility. * The dst_length argument to base16_decode_update and base64_decode_update is now both an input and output argument. On input it must now hold the size of the destination buffer, and decoding fails if that is not sufficient. Previously, dst_length was an output only, and it was required that the destination buffer was large enough for any input of the given src_length. Interface deletions: * Deleted the old struct aes_ctx, and all functions operating on it. Use the fixed key size interfaces instead, e.g., struct aes256_ctx, introduced in Nettle-3.0. * Deleted dsa-compat.h, and everything declared therein. Use the interface in dsa.h, introduced in Nettle-3.0. * Deleted old header sha.h. Use sha1.h or sha2.h instead, as appropriate. * Deleted the general HMAC interface, with functions like hmac_set_key that work with an arbitrary underlying hash function. Use the specific hmac functions instead, e.g., hmac_sha256_set_key, or the mac abstraction defined in nettle-meta.h, e.g, the nettle_hmac_sha256 instance. * Deleted the undocumented struct nettle_armor abstraction. * Deleted the undocumented function base64_encode_group. * Deleted md5-compat.h, and everything declared therein. Use the interface in md5.h instead (or even better, stop using md5). * Deleted pgp.h, and everything declared therein. This attempt to support openpgp formats was incomplete, undocumented, and mostly obsolete. * Delete all the *_DATA_SIZE compatibility aliases. Use corresponding *_BLOCK_SIZE constants instead, introduced in Nettle-3.0. * Deleted the obsolete functions _rsa_blind and _rsa_unblind. (Current RSA blinding in Nettle uses internal functions with a different interface). * Delete compatibility aliases salsa20_set_iv, SALSA20_IV_SIZE. These were renamed to salsa20_set_nonce and SALSA20_NONCE_SIZE in Nettle-3.0. * Deleted compatibility aliases _nettle_md5_compress, _nettle_sha1_compress. These internal functions were promoted to documented and supported functions in Nettle-3.9, with new names md5_compress and sha1_compress. * Deleted compatibility alias yarrow_force_reseed. Renamed to yarrow_slow_reseed in Nettle-2.0. ABI changes and improvements. * Introduce 16-byte alignment on certain types. Applied to union nettle_block16, and subkey arrays of AES and UMAC. This is intended to improve performance for SIMD load and store instructions, which on some platforms may be faster with proper alignment. The larger alignment is enabled only for platforms where the alignment of the uint64_t type is 8. * Size of struct gcm_key is reduced from 4096 bytes to 2048. * Size of the new sha3_ctx is considerable smaller, 216 bytes, than the previous types that included a buffer for a complete block. E.g., the largest one, for sha3_128_ctx (shake128), used to be 376 bytes. * Size of HMAC contexts have been reduced, by not including multiple block buffers. E.g, size of struct hmac_sha256_ctx reduced from 336 bytes to 192. This change has been discussed for a long time, with first attempt made by Dmitry Baryshkov years ago, but delayed, since it implies an ABI break. * For OCB block counters, use type uint32_t for blocks of associated data, and uint64_t for message blocks, instead of size_t. This makes the implementation limits the same for 32-bit and 64-bit platforms. Bug fixes: * Fix off-by-one bug in sexp parser, which could result in a one byte overread on invalid input. Also fix excessive recursion and stack usage for some inputs. Both problems reported via oss-fuzz. * Fix ed448_shake256_verify to check that the final signature octet is zero (previous versions completely ignored this somewhat redundant octet). Reported by Oren Yomtov. New features: * Support for SLH-DSA signatures (stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm). See the Nettle manual for details. * New public function drbg_ctr_aes256_update, to enable FIPS-compliant reseeding. Contributed by Daiki Ueno. Configure and build changes: * Support for at least C99 is required when building Nettle. In addition, support for alignof and alignas is required; these are part of C11, but intention is that this is the only required C11 feature. * The unusual configure options --with-lib-path and --with-include-path has been deleted. Use CFLAGS and LDFLAGS instead. This implies that Nettle's configure script no longer attempts to add rpath-related linker flags automagically; if any are needed, they must be passed in LDFLAGS. * The logic to sometimes change the default libdir has been deleted. Previously, configure tried to be helpful and change the default, e.g., to ${exec_prefix}/lib32 when you build 32-bit libraries on a system where ${exec_prefix}/lib is for 64-bit libraries. If you relied on this behavior, you now have to use the --libdir configure option. * Rearranged getopt files, now based on gnulib copies. -- Niels Möller. PGP key CB4962D070D77D7FCB8BA36271D8F1FF368C6677. Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.

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Re: Nettle 4.0
by Niels Möller 10 Feb '26

10 Feb '26

Niels Möller <nisse(a)lysator.liu.se> writes: > João Gomes writes: > >> In file included from nettle-meta.h:37:0, from non-nettle.h:38, >> from non-nettle.c:43: >> nettle-types.h:70:3: error: expected specifier-qualifier-list before ‘_Alignas’ >> In file included from ocb.h:38:0, >> from non-nettle.h:39, >> from non-nettle.c:43: >> aes.h:71:3: error: expected specifier-qualifier-list before ‘_Alignas’ >> aes.h:92:3: error: expected specifier-qualifier-list before ‘_Alignas’ >> aes.h:113:3: error: expected specifier-qualifier-list before ‘_Alignas’ >> make[1]: *** [Makefile:322: non-nettle.o] Error 1 > > Related to this note in NEWS: > > In addition, support for alignof and alignas is required; these are > part of C11, but intention is that this is the only required C11 > feature. > >> For your information, I can compile it without any errors on x86-x64, but not on ARM anymore. > > Which compiler and compiler options did you have this problem with? It's > somewhat odd that you appear to have stdalign.h, and a macro alignas > expanding to _Alignas, but the latter not working as expected. Apparently, this was with gcc-4.5.3, used in some build framework for embedded systems. This version was released in April 2011. I think support for stdalign.h was added in to GCC in version 4.7.0, released one year later, March 2012. I'm not that surprised that people doing embedded systems are sometimes using pretty old tool chains. I'm also told that Microsoft's C compiler didn't get stdalign.h until 2019. So my questions is: Are there others who are stuck with older compilers and getting trouble with Nettle's use of alignas/alignof? Is it somewhat common, or rather obscure? It's possible to add a --disable-align configure option, but it would get a bit complex since that option must control what goes into the installed header files. So I wonder if that's worth the effort? Regards, /Niels -- Niels Möller. PGP key CB4962D070D77D7FCB8BA36271D8F1FF368C6677. Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.

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Re: ANNOUNCE: nettle-4.0
by foo apr 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

Hi, It seems the 4.0 tags are not pushed to https://github.com/gnutls/nettle/tags, can you please take a look? /Foolbar

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