nettle-bugs April 2020

nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se

11 participants
18 discussions

[PATCH v2] poly1305: make internal symbols internal
by Dmitry Baryshkov 15 Apr '20

15 Apr '20

Make low-level poly1305 functions that were marked as "internal" in public header file really internal. Change their prefix from nettle to _nettle. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dbaryshkov(a)gmail.com> --- chacha-poly1305.c | 5 +-- poly1305-aes.c | 5 +-- poly1305-internal.c | 5 +-- poly1305-internal.h | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ poly1305.h | 14 -------- x86_64/poly1305-internal.asm | 12 +++---- 6 … [View More]files changed, 81 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 poly1305-internal.h diff --git a/chacha-poly1305.c b/chacha-poly1305.c index a15fef0cd742..47ca86bb360d 100644 --- a/chacha-poly1305.c +++ b/chacha-poly1305.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ #include "chacha-internal.h" #include "chacha-poly1305.h" +#include "poly1305-internal.h" #include "macros.h" @@ -80,7 +81,7 @@ chacha_poly1305_set_nonce (struct chacha_poly1305_ctx *ctx, chacha_set_nonce96 (&ctx->chacha, nonce); /* Generate authentication key */ _chacha_core (u.x, ctx->chacha.state, CHACHA_ROUNDS); - poly1305_set_key (&ctx->poly1305, u.subkey); + _poly1305_set_key (&ctx->poly1305, u.subkey); /* For final poly1305 processing */ memcpy (ctx->s.b, u.subkey + 16, 16); /* Increment block count */ @@ -162,6 +163,6 @@ chacha_poly1305_digest (struct chacha_poly1305_ctx *ctx, _poly1305_block (&ctx->poly1305, buf, 1); - poly1305_digest (&ctx->poly1305, &ctx->s); + _poly1305_digest (&ctx->poly1305, &ctx->s); memcpy (digest, &ctx->s.b, length); } diff --git a/poly1305-aes.c b/poly1305-aes.c index 1a27b1d85523..85a6d2ae138b 100644 --- a/poly1305-aes.c +++ b/poly1305-aes.c @@ -38,13 +38,14 @@ #include <string.h> #include "poly1305.h" +#include "poly1305-internal.h" #include "macros.h" void poly1305_aes_set_key (struct poly1305_aes_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t * key) { aes128_set_encrypt_key(&ctx->aes, (key)); - poly1305_set_key(&ctx->pctx, (key+16)); + _poly1305_set_key(&ctx->pctx, (key+16)); ctx->index = 0; } @@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ poly1305_aes_digest (struct poly1305_aes_ctx *ctx, } aes128_encrypt(&ctx->aes, POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, s.b, ctx->nonce); - poly1305_digest (&ctx->pctx, &s); + _poly1305_digest (&ctx->pctx, &s); memcpy (digest, s.b, length); INCREMENT (16, ctx->nonce); diff --git a/poly1305-internal.c b/poly1305-internal.c index 2ee16807c514..8713fcb68894 100644 --- a/poly1305-internal.c +++ b/poly1305-internal.c @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ #include <string.h> #include "poly1305.h" +#include "poly1305-internal.h" #include "macros.h" @@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ #define h4 hh void -poly1305_set_key(struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[16]) +_poly1305_set_key(struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[16]) { uint32_t t0,t1,t2,t3; @@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ _poly1305_block (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *m, unsigned t4) /* Adds digest to the nonce */ void -poly1305_digest (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, union nettle_block16 *s) +_poly1305_digest (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, union nettle_block16 *s) { uint32_t b, nb; uint64_t f0,f1,f2,f3; diff --git a/poly1305-internal.h b/poly1305-internal.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..edb80f7fa011 --- /dev/null +++ b/poly1305-internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +/* poly1305.h + + Poly1305 message authentication code. + + Copyright (C) 2013 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos + Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Niels Möller + + This file is part of GNU Nettle. + + GNU Nettle is free software: you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of either: + + * the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or + + * the GNU General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or both in parallel, as here. + + GNU Nettle is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + General Public License for more details. + + You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License and + the GNU Lesser General Public License along with this program. If + not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. +*/ + +#ifndef NETTLE_POLY1305_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED +#define NETTLE_POLY1305_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED + +#include "aes.h" + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + +/* Name mangling */ +#define _poly1305_set_key _nettle_poly1305_set_key +#define _poly1305_digest _nettle_poly1305_digest +#define _poly1305_block _nettle_poly1305_block + +/* Low level functions/macros for the poly1305 construction. */ + +#define POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE 16 +#define POLY1305_KEY_SIZE 16 + +/* Low-level internal interface. */ +void _poly1305_set_key(struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]); +/* Extracts digest, and adds it to s, the encrypted nonce. */ +void _poly1305_digest (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, union nettle_block16 *s); +/* Internal function. Process one block. */ +void _poly1305_block (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *m, + unsigned high); + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* NETTLE_POLY1305_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */ diff --git a/poly1305.h b/poly1305.h index eadc4057fe89..99c63c8a8288 100644 --- a/poly1305.h +++ b/poly1305.h @@ -42,10 +42,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif /* Name mangling */ -#define poly1305_set_key nettle_poly1305_set_key -#define poly1305_digest nettle_poly1305_digest -#define _poly1305_block _nettle_poly1305_block - #define poly1305_aes_set_key nettle_poly1305_aes_set_key #define poly1305_aes_set_nonce nettle_poly1305_aes_set_nonce #define poly1305_aes_update nettle_poly1305_aes_update @@ -53,9 +49,7 @@ extern "C" { /* Low level functions/macros for the poly1305 construction. */ -#define POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE 16 #define POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE 16 -#define POLY1305_KEY_SIZE 16 struct poly1305_ctx { /* Key, 128-bit value and some cached multiples. */ @@ -76,14 +70,6 @@ struct poly1305_ctx { } h; }; -/* Low-level internal interface. */ -void poly1305_set_key(struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[POLY1305_KEY_SIZE]); -/* Extracts digest, and adds it to s, the encrypted nonce. */ -void poly1305_digest (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, union nettle_block16 *s); -/* Internal function. Process one block. */ -void _poly1305_block (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *m, - unsigned high); - /* poly1305-aes */ #define POLY1305_AES_KEY_SIZE 32 diff --git a/x86_64/poly1305-internal.asm b/x86_64/poly1305-internal.asm index 98159ad391ec..8012e49f3781 100644 --- a/x86_64/poly1305-internal.asm +++ b/x86_64/poly1305-internal.asm @@ -41,14 +41,14 @@ define(<H0>, <%r9>) define(<H1>, <%r10>) define(<H2>, <%r11>) - C poly1305_set_key(struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[16]) + C _poly1305_set_key(struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t key[16]) .text C Registers: C %rdi: ctx C %rsi: key C %r8: mask ALIGN(16) -PROLOGUE(nettle_poly1305_set_key) +PROLOGUE(_nettle_poly1305_set_key) W64_ENTRY(2,0) mov $0x0ffffffc0fffffff, %r8 mov (%rsi), %rax @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ PROLOGUE(nettle_poly1305_set_key) W64_EXIT(2,0) ret -EPILOGUE(nettle_poly1305_set_key) +EPILOGUE(_nettle_poly1305_set_key) C 64-bit multiplication mod 2^130 - 5 C @@ -142,12 +142,12 @@ PROLOGUE(_nettle_poly1305_block) ret EPILOGUE(_nettle_poly1305_block) - C poly1305_digest (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *s) + C _poly1305_digest (struct poly1305_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *s) C Registers: C %rdi: ctx C %rsi: s -PROLOGUE(nettle_poly1305_digest) +PROLOGUE(_nettle_poly1305_digest) W64_ENTRY(2, 0) mov P1305_H0 (CTX), H0 @@ -182,5 +182,5 @@ define(<T1>, <%rax>) mov XREG(%rax), P1305_H2 (CTX) W64_EXIT(2, 0) ret -EPILOGUE(nettle_poly1305_digest) +EPILOGUE(_nettle_poly1305_digest) -- 2.25.1 [View Less]

2 1

Nettle-3.6 soon
by nisse＠lysator.liu.se 15 Apr '20

15 Apr '20

Hi, I've updated the NEWS file, and I don't think there are any easy changes pending. Please let me know ASAP if there's anything missing in NEWS, or if there are additional changes you think ought to be included before release. I intend to create a release-candidate tarball in a day or two for final testing. Regards, /Niels -- Niels Möller. PGP-encrypted email is preferred. Keyid 368C6677. Internet email is subject to wholesale government surveillance.

6 33

[PATCH] ecc-random: don't apply bitwise operation to boolean arguments
by Dmitry Baryshkov 15 Apr '20

15 Apr '20

ecdsa_in_range applies bitwise and to int and boolean arguments, which can result in unpredictable behaviour. Use logical and instead. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dbaryshkov(a)gmail.com> --- ecc-random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ecc-random.c b/ecc-random.c index 79df511cb6b6..e80405fe46fd 100644 --- a/ecc-random.c +++ b/ecc-random.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ecdsa_in_range (const struct ecc_modulo *m, { /* Check if 0 < x < q, with data … [View More]

2 1

[PATCH] Implement GOST VKO key derivation algorithm
by dbaryshkov＠gmail.com 14 Apr '20

14 Apr '20

From: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov <dbaryshkov(a)gmail.com> --- Makefile.in | 2 +- gostdsa-vko.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ gostdsa.h | 7 +++ testsuite/.gitignore | 1 + testsuite/.test-rules.make | 3 ++ testsuite/Makefile.in | 2 +- testsuite/gostdsa-vko-test.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 182 insertions(+),… [View More] 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 gostdsa-vko.c create mode 100644 testsuite/gostdsa-vko-test.c diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index d4fcb81302a2..8f031d7a580d 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ hogweed_SOURCES = sexp.c sexp-format.c \ ecc-ecdsa-sign.c ecdsa-sign.c \ ecc-ecdsa-verify.c ecdsa-verify.c ecdsa-keygen.c \ ecc-gostdsa-sign.c gostdsa-sign.c \ - ecc-gostdsa-verify.c gostdsa-verify.c \ + ecc-gostdsa-verify.c gostdsa-verify.c gostdsa-vko.c \ curve25519-mul-g.c curve25519-mul.c curve25519-eh-to-x.c \ curve448-mul-g.c curve448-mul.c curve448-eh-to-x.c \ eddsa-compress.c eddsa-decompress.c eddsa-expand.c \ diff --git a/gostdsa-vko.c b/gostdsa-vko.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f78159a736b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/gostdsa-vko.c @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* gostdsa-vko.c + + Copyright (C) 2016 Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov + + This file is part of GNU Nettle. + + GNU Nettle is free software: you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of either: + + * the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or + + * the GNU General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or both in parallel, as here. + + GNU Nettle is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + General Public License for more details. + + You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License and + the GNU Lesser General Public License along with this program. If + not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. +*/ + +#if HAVE_CONFIG_H +# include "config.h" +#endif + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + +#include "ecc-internal.h" +#include "gostdsa.h" + +int +gostdsa_vko(const struct ecc_scalar *key, + const struct ecc_point *pub, + size_t ukm_length, const uint8_t *ukm, + size_t out_length, uint8_t *out) +{ + const struct ecc_curve *ecc = key->ecc; + unsigned bsize = (ecc_bit_size(ecc) + 7) / 8; + mp_size_t size = ecc->p.size; + mp_size_t itch = 4*size + ecc->mul_itch; + mp_limb_t *scratch; + + if (itch < 5*size + ecc->h_to_a_itch) + itch = 5*size + ecc->h_to_a_itch; + + if (pub->ecc != ecc) + return 0; + + if (out_length < 2 * bsize) { + return 0; + } + + scratch = gmp_alloc_limbs (itch); + + mpn_set_base256_le (scratch, size, ukm, ukm_length); + if (mpn_zero_p (scratch, size)) + mpn_add_1 (scratch, scratch, size, 1); + ecc_mod_mul (&ecc->q, scratch + 3*size, key->p, scratch); + ecc->mul (ecc, scratch, scratch + 3*size, pub->p, scratch + 4*size); + ecc->h_to_a (ecc, 0, scratch + 3*size, scratch, scratch + 5*size); + mpn_get_base256_le (out, bsize, scratch + 3*size, size); + mpn_get_base256_le (out+bsize, bsize, scratch + 4*size, size); + gmp_free_limbs (scratch, itch); + + return 2 * bsize; +} diff --git a/gostdsa.h b/gostdsa.h index c92dfd1e1dd6..6667d0f1d3a8 100644 --- a/gostdsa.h +++ b/gostdsa.h @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ extern "C" { /* Name mangling */ #define gostdsa_sign nettle_gostdsa_sign #define gostdsa_verify nettle_gostdsa_verify +#define gostdsa_vko nettle_gostdsa_vko #define ecc_gostdsa_sign nettle_ecc_gostdsa_sign #define ecc_gostdsa_sign_itch nettle_ecc_gostdsa_sign_itch #define ecc_gostdsa_verify nettle_ecc_gostdsa_verify @@ -68,6 +69,12 @@ gostdsa_verify (const struct ecc_point *pub, size_t length, const uint8_t *digest, const struct dsa_signature *signature); +int +gostdsa_vko(const struct ecc_scalar *key, + const struct ecc_point *pub, + size_t ukm_length, const uint8_t *ukm, + size_t out_length, uint8_t *out); + /* Low-level GOSTDSA functions. */ mp_size_t ecc_gostdsa_sign_itch (const struct ecc_curve *ecc); diff --git a/testsuite/.gitignore b/testsuite/.gitignore index b8b36c2accc2..a2b3d52312cd 100644 --- a/testsuite/.gitignore +++ b/testsuite/.gitignore @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ /gostdsa-keygen-test /gostdsa-sign-test /gostdsa-verify-test +/gostdsa-vko-test /gosthash94-test /hkdf-test /hmac-test diff --git a/testsuite/.test-rules.make b/testsuite/.test-rules.make index 922a2c7f1350..b340e3c1b7b9 100644 --- a/testsuite/.test-rules.make +++ b/testsuite/.test-rules.make @@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ gostdsa-verify-test$(EXEEXT): gostdsa-verify-test.$(OBJEXT) gostdsa-keygen-test$(EXEEXT): gostdsa-keygen-test.$(OBJEXT) $(LINK) gostdsa-keygen-test.$(OBJEXT) $(TEST_OBJS) -o gostdsa-keygen-test$(EXEEXT) +gostdsa-vko-test$(EXEEXT): gostdsa-vko-test.$(OBJEXT) + $(LINK) gostdsa-vko-test.$(OBJEXT) $(TEST_OBJS) -o gostdsa-vko-test$(EXEEXT) + sha1-huge-test$(EXEEXT): sha1-huge-test.$(OBJEXT) $(LINK) sha1-huge-test.$(OBJEXT) $(TEST_OBJS) -o sha1-huge-test$(EXEEXT) diff --git a/testsuite/Makefile.in b/testsuite/Makefile.in index 813467a548bd..9f87c86b1c2f 100644 --- a/testsuite/Makefile.in +++ b/testsuite/Makefile.in @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ TS_HOGWEED_SOURCES = sexp-test.c sexp-format-test.c \ eddsa-compress-test.c eddsa-sign-test.c \ eddsa-verify-test.c ed25519-test.c ed448-test.c \ gostdsa-sign-test.c gostdsa-verify-test.c \ - gostdsa-keygen-test.c + gostdsa-keygen-test.c gostdsa-vko-test.c TS_SOURCES = $(TS_NETTLE_SOURCES) $(TS_HOGWEED_SOURCES) CXX_SOURCES = cxx-test.cxx diff --git a/testsuite/gostdsa-vko-test.c b/testsuite/gostdsa-vko-test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9c86774198ed --- /dev/null +++ b/testsuite/gostdsa-vko-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +#include "testutils.h" +#include "gostdsa.h" +#include "streebog.h" + +static void +test_vko (const struct ecc_curve *ecc, + const char *priv, + const char *x, + const char *y, + const struct tstring *ukm, + const struct nettle_hash *hash, + void * hash_ctx, + const struct tstring *res) +{ + struct ecc_scalar ecc_key; + struct ecc_point ecc_pub; + mpz_t temp1, temp2; + int ret; + uint8_t out[128]; + + ecc_point_init (&ecc_pub, ecc); + mpz_init_set_str (temp1, x, 16); + mpz_init_set_str (temp2, y, 16); + ASSERT (ecc_point_set (&ecc_pub, temp1, temp2) != 0); + + ecc_scalar_init (&ecc_key, ecc); + mpz_set_str (temp1, priv, 16); + ASSERT (ecc_scalar_set (&ecc_key, temp1) != 0); + + mpz_clear (temp1); + mpz_clear (temp2); + + ret = gostdsa_vko (&ecc_key, &ecc_pub, + ukm->length, ukm->data, + sizeof(out), out); + ASSERT (ret != 0); + + ecc_scalar_clear (&ecc_key); + ecc_point_clear (&ecc_pub); + + hash->init (hash_ctx); + hash->update (hash_ctx, ret, out); + hash->digest (hash_ctx, hash->digest_size, out); + + ASSERT (hash->digest_size == res->length); + ASSERT (MEMEQ (res->length, out, res->data)); +} + +void +test_main (void) +{ + struct streebog256_ctx ctx_256; + struct streebog256_ctx ctx_512; + + test_vko(nettle_get_gost_gc512a(), + "67b63ca4ac8d2bb32618d89296c7476dbeb9f9048496f202b1902cf2ce41dbc2f847712d960483458d4b380867f426c7ca0ff5782702dbc44ee8fc72d9ec90c9", + "51a6d54ee932d176e87591121cce5f395cb2f2f147114d95f463c8a7ed74a9fc5ecd2325a35fb6387831ea66bc3d2aa42ede35872cc75372073a71b983e12f19", + "793bde5bf72840ad22b02a363ae4772d4a52fc08ba1a20f7458a222a13bf98b53be002d1973f1e398ce46c17da6d00d9b6d0076f8284dcc42e599b4c413b8804", + SHEX("1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27"), + &nettle_streebog256, + &ctx_256, + SHEX("c9 a9 a7 73 20 e2 cc 55 9e d7 2d ce 6f 47 e2 19 2c ce a9 5f a6 48 67 05 82 c0 54 c0 ef 36 c2 21")); + + test_vko(nettle_get_gost_gc512a(), + "dbd09213a592da5bbfd8ed068cccccbbfbeda4feac96b9b4908591440b0714803b9eb763ef932266d4c0181a9b73eacf9013efc65ec07c888515f1b6f759c848", + "a7c0adb12743c10c3c1beb97c8f631242f7937a1deb6bce5e664e49261baccd3f5dc56ec53b2abb90ca1eb703078ba546655a8b99f79188d2021ffaba4edb0aa", + "5adb1c63a4e4465e0bbefd897fb9016475934cfa0f8c95f992ea402d47921f46382d00481b720314b19d8c878e75d81b9763358dd304b2ed3a364e07a3134691", + SHEX("1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27"), + &nettle_streebog256, + &ctx_256, + SHEX("c9 a9 a7 73 20 e2 cc 55 9e d7 2d ce 6f 47 e2 19 2c ce a9 5f a6 48 67 05 82 c0 54 c0 ef 36 c2 21")); + + test_vko(nettle_get_gost_gc512a(), + "67b63ca4ac8d2bb32618d89296c7476dbeb9f9048496f202b1902cf2ce41dbc2f847712d960483458d4b380867f426c7ca0ff5782702dbc44ee8fc72d9ec90c9", + "51a6d54ee932d176e87591121cce5f395cb2f2f147114d95f463c8a7ed74a9fc5ecd2325a35fb6387831ea66bc3d2aa42ede35872cc75372073a71b983e12f19", + "793bde5bf72840ad22b02a363ae4772d4a52fc08ba1a20f7458a222a13bf98b53be002d1973f1e398ce46c17da6d00d9b6d0076f8284dcc42e599b4c413b8804", + SHEX("1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27"), + &nettle_streebog512, + &ctx_512, + SHEX("79 f0 02 a9 69 40 ce 7b de 32 59 a5 2e 01 52 97 ad aa d8 45 97 a0 d2 05 b5 0e 3e 17 19 f9 7b fa" + "7e e1 d2 66 1f a9 97 9a 5a a2 35 b5 58 a7 e6 d9 f8 8f 98 2d d6 3f c3 5a 8e c0 dd 5e 24 2d 3b df")); + + test_vko(nettle_get_gost_gc512a(), + "dbd09213a592da5bbfd8ed068cccccbbfbeda4feac96b9b4908591440b0714803b9eb763ef932266d4c0181a9b73eacf9013efc65ec07c888515f1b6f759c848", + "a7c0adb12743c10c3c1beb97c8f631242f7937a1deb6bce5e664e49261baccd3f5dc56ec53b2abb90ca1eb703078ba546655a8b99f79188d2021ffaba4edb0aa", + "5adb1c63a4e4465e0bbefd897fb9016475934cfa0f8c95f992ea402d47921f46382d00481b720314b19d8c878e75d81b9763358dd304b2ed3a364e07a3134691", + SHEX("1d 80 60 3c 85 44 c7 27"), + &nettle_streebog512, + &ctx_512, + SHEX("79 f0 02 a9 69 40 ce 7b de 32 59 a5 2e 01 52 97 ad aa d8 45 97 a0 d2 05 b5 0e 3e 17 19 f9 7b fa" + "7e e1 d2 66 1f a9 97 9a 5a a2 35 b5 58 a7 e6 d9 f8 8f 98 2d d6 3f c3 5a 8e c0 dd 5e 24 2d 3b df")); +} -- 2.25.0 [View Less]

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[PATCH] poly1305: make internal symbols internal
by Dmitry Baryshkov 14 Apr '20

14 Apr '20

2 2

[PATCH] (revision 3.1) Added bcrypt() support.
by Stephen R. van den Berg 07 Apr '20

07 Apr '20

--- Makefile.in | 2 +- base64-decode.c | 17 +- blowfish-bcrypt.c | 511 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ blowfish.h => blowfish-internal.h | 51 +-- blowfish.c | 23 +- blowfish.h | 15 + nettle.texinfo | 67 ++++ 7 files changed, 620 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) create mode 100644 blowfish-bcrypt.c copy blowfish.h => blowfish-internal.h (50%) diff --git a/… [View More]Makefile.in b/Makefile.in index ddc30428..bfb7ac57 100644 --- a/Makefile.in +++ b/Makefile.in @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ nettle_SOURCES = aes-decrypt-internal.c aes-decrypt.c \ aes256-set-encrypt-key.c aes256-set-decrypt-key.c \ aes256-meta.c \ arcfour.c arcfour-crypt.c \ - arctwo.c arctwo-meta.c blowfish.c \ + arctwo.c arctwo-meta.c blowfish.c blowfish-bcrypt.c \ base16-encode.c base16-decode.c base16-meta.c \ base64-encode.c base64-decode.c base64-meta.c \ base64url-encode.c base64url-decode.c base64url-meta.c \ diff --git a/base64-decode.c b/base64-decode.c index b993117a..9273224a 100644 --- a/base64-decode.c +++ b/base64-decode.c @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ void base64_decode_init(struct base64_decode_ctx *ctx) { - static const signed char base64_decode_table[0x100] = + static const signed char base64_decode_table[0x80] = { /* White space is HT, VT, FF, CR, LF and SPC */ -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -2, -2, -2, -2, -2, -1, -1, @@ -56,14 +56,6 @@ base64_decode_init(struct base64_decode_ctx *ctx) 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, - -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, }; ctx->word = ctx->bits = ctx->padding = 0; @@ -75,7 +67,12 @@ base64_decode_single(struct base64_decode_ctx *ctx, uint8_t *dst, char src) { - int data = ctx->table[(uint8_t) src]; + int data; + + if ((uint8_t) src > 0x7f) + return -1; + + data = ctx->table[(uint8_t) src]; switch(data) { diff --git a/blowfish-bcrypt.c b/blowfish-bcrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e573c86e --- /dev/null +++ b/blowfish-bcrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,511 @@ +/* blowfish-bcrypt.c + + The blowfish bcrypt implementation. + + Copyright (c) 2020 Stephen R. van den Berg + + This file is part of GNU Nettle. + + GNU Nettle is free software: you can redistribute it and/or + modify it under the terms of either: + + * the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or + + * the GNU General Public License as published by the Free + Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + option) any later version. + + or both in parallel, as here. + + GNU Nettle is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + General Public License for more details. + + You should have received copies of the GNU General Public License and + the GNU Lesser General Public License along with this program. If + not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. +*/ + +#if HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#endif + +#include <assert.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> + +#include "blowfish.h" +#include "blowfish-internal.h" +#include "base64.h" + +#include "macros.h" + +#define CRYPTPLEN 7 +#define SALTLEN ((BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE*8+5) / 6) + +#define HASHOFFSET (CRYPTPLEN + SALTLEN) + +static const signed char radix64_decode_table[0x80] = { + /* White space is HT, VT, FF, CR, LF and SPC */ + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -2, -2, -2, -2, -2, -1, -1, + -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, + -2, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 0, 1, + 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, -1, -1, -1, -3, -1, -1, + -1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, + 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, + -1, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, + 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, +}; + +static const char radix64_encode_table[64] = + "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" + "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" + "0123456789"; + +int +blowfish_bcrypt_verify(const char *key, + const char *hashed) +{ + char newhash[BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_HASH_SIZE]; + + return blowfish_bcrypt_hash(sizeof newhash, + newhash, key, hashed, -1, (void*)0) + && !strcmp(newhash, hashed); +} + +static char *encode_radix64(char *dst, size_t len, const uint8_t *src) +{ + struct base64_encode_ctx ctx; + base64_encode_init(&ctx); + ctx.alphabet = radix64_encode_table; + dst += base64_encode_update(&ctx, dst, len, src); + dst += base64_encode_final(&ctx, dst); + *--dst = '\0'; /* Strip the trailing = */ + return dst; +} + +/* + * Large parts of the code below are based on public domain sources. + * The comments and copyright notices have been preserved. + * Any code added or modified by me is licensed under the + * licenses listed above. -- Stephen R. van den Berg + */ + +/* + * This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant + * and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password + * cracking removed. + * + * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2015. + * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public + * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software + * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is + * Copyright (c) 1998-2015 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the + * general public under the following terms: + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted. + * + * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. + * + * It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system, + * as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security, + * ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate + * it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in + * the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let + * you place this code and any modifications you make under a license + * of your choice. + * + * This implementation is fully compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c for prefix + * "$2b$", originally by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and it uses + * some of his ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David + * Mazieres <dm at lcs.mit.edu>. For information on the level of + * compatibility for bcrypt hash prefixes other than "$2b$", please refer to + * the comments in set_key() below and to the included crypt(3) man page. + */ + +typedef uint32_t bf_key[_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]; + +/* + * Magic IV for 64 Blowfish encryptions that we do at the end. + * The string is "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" on big-endian. + */ +static uint32_t magic_w[6] = { + 0x4F727068, 0x65616E42, 0x65686F6C, + 0x64657253, 0x63727944, 0x6F756274 +}; + +static void swap32(uint32_t *x, int count) +{ +#if !WORDS_BIGENDIAN + do { + uint32_t tmp = *x; + tmp = (tmp << 16) | (tmp >> 16); + *x++ = ((tmp & 0x00FF00FF) << 8) | ((tmp >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF); + } while (--count); +#endif +} + +static void set_xkey(const char *key, bf_key expanded, bf_key initial, + unsigned bug, uint32_t safety) +{ + const char *ptr = key; + unsigned i, j; + uint32_t sign, diff, tmp[2]; + +/* + * There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While + * we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide + * a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and + * a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain + * multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to + * the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally + * deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions. + * While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing + * characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a + * collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects + * only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of + * those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid + * UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings. + * Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a + * reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that + * are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm. + * + * We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password + * information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead + * of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password + * length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is + * difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by + * the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.) + * + * For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug" + * (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the + * variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested). + * Valid combinations of settings are: + * + * Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000 + * Prefix "$2b$": bug = 0, safety = 0 + * Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0 + * Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0 + */ + + sign = diff = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < _BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i++) { + tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0; + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { + tmp[0] <<= 8; + tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */ + tmp[1] <<= 8; + tmp[1] |= (signed char)*ptr; /* bug */ +/* + * Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet, + * and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For + * chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign + * extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set. + */ + if (j) + sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80; + if (!*ptr) + ptr = key; + else + ptr++; + } + diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */ + + expanded[i] = tmp[bug]; + initial[i] = _nettle_blowfish_initial_ctx.p[i] ^ tmp[bug]; + } + +/* + * At this point, "diff" is zero if the correct and buggy algorithms produced + * exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates + * that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a + * collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of + * passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure + * is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by + * deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this. + */ + diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero if exact match */ + diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */ + diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set if "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */ + sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */ + sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */ + +/* + * If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm, + * flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but + * let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's + * not any worse than any other choice we could make.) + * + * It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main + * Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a + * state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm + * (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect). + */ + initial[0] ^= sign; +} + +static int ibcrypt(size_t length, char *dst, + const char *key, const char *scheme, + int minlog2rounds, + int log2rounds, const uint8_t *salt) +{ + struct { + struct blowfish_ctx ctx; + bf_key expanded_key; + union { + uint32_t salt[4]; + uint32_t output[6]; + } binary; + } data; + uint8_t psalt[BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE]; + uint32_t L, R; + uint32_t *ptr; + uint32_t count; + int i; + size_t schemelen = strlen(scheme); + unsigned cscheme; + unsigned bug = 0; + uint32_t safety = 0; + if (length < BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_HASH_SIZE || + schemelen < 2) + return 0; + + if (schemelen >= 3 && *scheme++ != '$') + return 0; + if (*scheme++ != '2') + return 0; + + switch (cscheme = *scheme++) { + default: + return 0; + case 'a': safety = 0x10000; + break; + case 'x': bug = 1; + break; + case 'b': case 'y': + break; + } + + if (schemelen >= 4) { + if (*scheme++ != '$') + return 0; + if (schemelen >= 6) { + if (log2rounds < 0) + log2rounds = atoi(scheme); + scheme += 2; + if (schemelen >= CRYPTPLEN && *scheme++ != '$') + return 0; + if (schemelen >= HASHOFFSET && !salt) { + struct base64_decode_ctx ctx; + size_t saltlen = BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE; + + base64_decode_init(&ctx); + ctx.table = radix64_decode_table; + + if (!base64_decode_update(&ctx, &saltlen, (uint8_t *) data.binary.salt, + SALTLEN, scheme) + || saltlen != BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE) + return 0; + } + } + } + + if (salt) + memcpy(data.binary.salt, salt, BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE); + else if (schemelen < HASHOFFSET) + return 0; + memcpy(psalt, data.binary.salt, BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE); + swap32(data.binary.salt, 4); + + if (log2rounds < minlog2rounds || log2rounds > 31) + return 0; + count = (uint32_t)1 << log2rounds; + + set_xkey(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.p, bug, safety); + memcpy(data.ctx.s, _nettle_blowfish_initial_ctx.s, sizeof(data.ctx.s)); + + L = R = 0; + for (i = 0; i < _BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i += 2) { + L ^= data.binary.salt[i & 2]; + R ^= data.binary.salt[(i & 2) + 1]; + _nettle_blowfish_encround(&data.ctx, &L, &R); + data.ctx.p[i] = L; + data.ctx.p[i + 1] = R; + } + + ptr = data.ctx.s[0]; + do { + ptr += 4; + L ^= data.binary.salt[(_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2) & 3]; + R ^= data.binary.salt[(_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 3) & 3]; + _nettle_blowfish_encround(&data.ctx, &L, &R); + *(ptr - 4) = L; + *(ptr - 3) = R; + + L ^= data.binary.salt[(_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 4) & 3]; + R ^= data.binary.salt[(_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 5) & 3]; + _nettle_blowfish_encround(&data.ctx, &L, &R); + *(ptr - 2) = L; + *(ptr - 1) = R; + } while (ptr < &data.ctx.s[3][0xFF]); + + do { + int done; + + for (i = 0; i < _BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i += 2) { + data.ctx.p[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i]; + data.ctx.p[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1]; + } + + done = 0; + do { + uint32_t tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4; + + L = R = 0; + ptr = data.ctx.p; + do { + ptr += 2; + _nettle_blowfish_encround(&data.ctx, &L, &R); + *(ptr - 2) = L; + *(ptr - 1) = R; + } while (ptr < &data.ctx.p[_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]); + + ptr = data.ctx.s[0]; + do { + ptr += 2; + _nettle_blowfish_encround(&data.ctx, &L, &R); + *(ptr - 2) = L; + *(ptr - 1) = R; + } while (ptr < &data.ctx.s[3][0xFF]); + + if (done) + break; + done = 1; + + tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0]; + tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1]; + tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2]; + tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3]; + for (i = 0; i < _BLOWFISH_ROUNDS; i += 4) { + data.ctx.p[i] ^= tmp1; + data.ctx.p[i + 1] ^= tmp2; + data.ctx.p[i + 2] ^= tmp3; + data.ctx.p[i + 3] ^= tmp4; + } + data.ctx.p[16] ^= tmp1; + data.ctx.p[17] ^= tmp2; + } while (1); + } while (--count); + + for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) { + L = magic_w[i]; + R = magic_w[i + 1]; + + count = 64; + do + _nettle_blowfish_encround(&data.ctx, &L, &R); + while (--count); + + data.binary.output[i] = L; + data.binary.output[i + 1] = R; + } + + *dst++ = '$'; + *dst++ = '2'; + *dst++ = cscheme; + *dst++ = '$'; + *dst++ = '0' + log2rounds / 10; + *dst++ = '0' + log2rounds % 10; + *dst++ = '$'; + dst = encode_radix64(dst, BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE, psalt) - 1; + + swap32(data.binary.output, 6); +/* This has to be bug-compatible with the original implementation, so + only encode 23 of the 24 bytes. */ + encode_radix64(dst, 23, (uint8_t *) data.binary.output); + return cscheme; +} + +/* + * Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once: + * + * 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g. + * when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or + * library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or + * it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile + * might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such + * as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover + * from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not + * enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed. + * + * 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash + * computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code + * would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash + * computation is more reliable. + * + * The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08" + * setting. + */ +int blowfish_bcrypt_hash(size_t length, char *dst, + const char *key, const char *scheme, + int log2rounds, const uint8_t *salt) +{ + const char *test_pw = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"; + const char *test_scheme = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu"; + static const char * const test_hashes[2] = + {"i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55", /* 'a', 'b', 'y' */ + "VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55"}; /* 'x' */ + const char *test_hash = test_hashes[0]; + int cscheme; + int ok; + struct { + char s[HASHOFFSET + 1]; + char o[HASHOFFSET + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1]; + } buf; + + if (length) + *dst = '\0'; +/* Hash the supplied password */ + cscheme = ibcrypt(length, dst, key, scheme, 4, log2rounds, salt); + +/* + * Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to ibcrypt() + * from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations, + * which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the + * stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be + * detected by the self-test. + */ + memcpy(buf.s, test_scheme, sizeof(buf.s)); + + if (cscheme) + test_hash = test_hashes[(buf.s[2] = cscheme) == 'x']; + + memset(buf.o, 0x55, sizeof(buf.o)); + buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0; + ok = ibcrypt(sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), buf.o, test_pw, + buf.s, 0, -1, (void*)0); + + ok = (ok && + !memcmp(buf.o, buf.s, HASHOFFSET) && + !memcmp(buf.o + HASHOFFSET, test_hash, 31 + 1 + 1 + 1)); + + { + const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"; + bf_key ae, ai, ye, yi; + set_xkey(k, ae, ai, 0, 0x10000); /* $2a$ */ + set_xkey(k, ye, yi, 0, 0); /* $2y$ */ + ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */ + ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 && + !memcmp(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) && + !memcmp(ai, yi, sizeof(ai)); + } + + return ok && !!cscheme; +} diff --git a/blowfish.h b/blowfish-internal.h similarity index 50% copy from blowfish.h copy to blowfish-internal.h index bcdc7cb6..da28fa34 100644 --- a/blowfish.h +++ b/blowfish-internal.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* blowfish.h +/* blowfish-internal.h Blowfish block cipher. @@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ not, see http://www.gnu.org/licenses/. */ -#ifndef NETTLE_BLOWFISH_H_INCLUDED -#define NETTLE_BLOWFISH_H_INCLUDED +#ifndef NETTLE_BLOWFISH_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED +#define NETTLE_BLOWFISH_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED #include "nettle-types.h" @@ -41,49 +41,12 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* Name mangling */ -#define blowfish_set_key nettle_blowfish_set_key -#define blowfish128_set_key nettle_blowfish128_set_key -#define blowfish_encrypt nettle_blowfish_encrypt -#define blowfish_decrypt nettle_blowfish_decrypt - -#define BLOWFISH_BLOCK_SIZE 8 - -/* Variable key size between 64 and 448 bits. */ -#define BLOWFISH_MIN_KEY_SIZE 8 -#define BLOWFISH_MAX_KEY_SIZE 56 - -/* Default to 128 bits */ -#define BLOWFISH_KEY_SIZE 16 - -#define BLOWFISH128_KEY_SIZE 16 - -#define _BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16 - -struct blowfish_ctx -{ - uint32_t s[4][256]; - uint32_t p[_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS+2]; -}; - -/* Returns 0 for weak keys, otherwise 1. */ -int -blowfish_set_key(struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, - size_t length, const uint8_t *key); -int -blowfish128_set_key(struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *key); - -void -blowfish_encrypt(const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, - size_t length, uint8_t *dst, - const uint8_t *src); -void -blowfish_decrypt(const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, - size_t length, uint8_t *dst, - const uint8_t *src); +extern const struct blowfish_ctx _nettle_blowfish_initial_ctx; +extern void _nettle_blowfish_encround (const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, + uint32_t * ret_xl, uint32_t * ret_xr); #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif -#endif /* NETTLE_BLOWFISH_H_INCLUDED */ +#endif /* NETTLE_BLOWFISH_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */ diff --git a/blowfish.c b/blowfish.c index 52040f13..e73caffe 100644 --- a/blowfish.c +++ b/blowfish.c @@ -54,12 +54,13 @@ #include <assert.h> #include "blowfish.h" +#include "blowfish-internal.h" #include "macros.h" /* precomputed S boxes */ -static const struct blowfish_ctx -initial_ctx = { +const struct blowfish_ctx +_nettle_blowfish_initial_ctx = { { { /* ks0 */ 0xD1310BA6, 0x98DFB5AC, 0x2FFD72DB, 0xD01ADFB7, 0xB8E1AFED, 0x6A267E96, @@ -261,8 +262,8 @@ initial_ctx = { #define R(c, l,r,i) do { l ^= c->p[i]; r ^= F(c,l); } while(0) -static void -encrypt (const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, uint32_t * ret_xl, +void +_nettle_blowfish_encround (const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, uint32_t * ret_xl, uint32_t * ret_xr) { uint32_t xl, xr; @@ -295,7 +296,7 @@ encrypt (const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, uint32_t * ret_xl, } static void -decrypt (const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, uint32_t * ret_xl, uint32_t * ret_xr) +decround (const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, uint32_t * ret_xl, uint32_t * ret_xr) { uint32_t xl, xr; @@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ blowfish_encrypt (const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, d1 = READ_UINT32(src); d2 = READ_UINT32(src+4); - encrypt (ctx, &d1, &d2); + _nettle_blowfish_encround (ctx, &d1, &d2); dst[0] = (d1 >> 24) & 0xff; dst[1] = (d1 >> 16) & 0xff; dst[2] = (d1 >> 8) & 0xff; @@ -361,7 +362,7 @@ blowfish_decrypt (const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, d1 = READ_UINT32(src); d2 = READ_UINT32(src+4); - decrypt (ctx, &d1, &d2); + decround (ctx, &d1, &d2); dst[0] = (d1 >> 24) & 0xff; dst[1] = (d1 >> 16) & 0xff; dst[2] = (d1 >> 8) & 0xff; @@ -380,7 +381,7 @@ blowfish_set_key (struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, int i, j; uint32_t data, datal, datar; - *ctx = initial_ctx; + *ctx = _nettle_blowfish_initial_ctx; for (i = j = 0; i < _BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i++) { @@ -393,15 +394,15 @@ blowfish_set_key (struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, datal = datar = 0; for (i = 0; i < _BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2; i += 2) { - encrypt (ctx, &datal, &datar); + _nettle_blowfish_encround (ctx, &datal, &datar); ctx->p[i] = datal; ctx->p[i + 1] = datar; } - + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) for (i = 0; i < 256; i += 2) { - encrypt (ctx, &datal, &datar); + _nettle_blowfish_encround (ctx, &datal, &datar); ctx->s[j][i] = datal; ctx->s[j][i + 1] = datar; } diff --git a/blowfish.h b/blowfish.h index bcdc7cb6..af48e20f 100644 --- a/blowfish.h +++ b/blowfish.h @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ extern "C" { #define blowfish128_set_key nettle_blowfish128_set_key #define blowfish_encrypt nettle_blowfish_encrypt #define blowfish_decrypt nettle_blowfish_decrypt +#define blowfish_bcrypt_hash nettle_blowfish_bcrypt_hash +#define blowfish_bcrypt_verify nettle_blowfish_bcrypt_verify #define BLOWFISH_BLOCK_SIZE 8 @@ -60,6 +62,9 @@ extern "C" { #define _BLOWFISH_ROUNDS 16 +#define BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_HASH_SIZE (60 + 1) /* Including null-terminator */ +#define BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE 16 /* Binary string size */ + struct blowfish_ctx { uint32_t s[4][256]; @@ -81,6 +86,16 @@ void blowfish_decrypt(const struct blowfish_ctx *ctx, size_t length, uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src); +int +blowfish_bcrypt_hash(size_t length, + char *dst, + const char *key, + const char *scheme, + int log2rounds, + const uint8_t *salt); +int +blowfish_bcrypt_verify(const char *key, + const char *hashed); #ifdef __cplusplus } diff --git a/nettle.texinfo b/nettle.texinfo index ff64889c..13b1df39 100644 --- a/nettle.texinfo +++ b/nettle.texinfo @@ -1512,6 +1512,73 @@ in any other way. Analogous to @code{blowfish_encrypt} @end deftypefun +@deftypefun int blowfish_bcrypt_hash (size_t @var{length}, char *@var{dst}, const char *@var{key}, const char *@var{scheme}, int @var{log2rounds}, const uint8_t *@var{salt}) +Compute the bcrypt password hash. +The function will return @code{0} if the hash cannot be computed +due to invalid input. +The function will return @code{1} and store the computed hash +in the array pointed to by @var{dst}. The hash is computed based +on the chosen @var{scheme}, number of rounds @var{log2rounds} and +specified @var{salt}. + +@var{length} must be at least @code{BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_HASH_SIZE}. + +@var{dst} must point to a character array of the specified @var{length}. + +@var{key} contains the zero terminated plaintext password string. + +@var{scheme} contains either just the chosen scheme (valid schemes +are: @code{2a}, @code{2b}, @code{2x} or @code{2y}), or +(the prefix of) an existing hashed password (typically @code{$2b$10$...}). + +@var{log2rounds} contains the log2 of the number of encryption rounds +that must be used to compute the hash. If it is @code{-1} the value +will be extracted from @var{scheme}. + +@var{salt} should point to an array of @code{BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE} +random bytes to be used to perturb the hash computation. If it is @code{NULL} +the salt will be extracted from @var{scheme}. + +Sample code to generate a bcrypt hash: +@example +char cleartxtpassword[] = "ExamplePassword"; +uint8_t salt[BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_BINSALT_SIZE]; +@dots{} +/* Make sure that salt is filled with random bytes */ +@dots{} +char hashedresult[BLOWFISH_BCRYPT_HASH_SIZE]; +int result = blowfish_bcrypt(sizeof(hashedresult), hashedresult, + cleartxtpassword, "2b", 10, salt); +if (result) + printf("%s\n", hashedresult); +@end example +@end deftypefun + +@deftypefun int blowfish_bcrypt_verify (const char *@var{key}, const char *@var{hashed}) +Verifies the bcrypt password hash against the supplied plaintext password. +The function will return @code{0} if the password does not match. +The function will return @code{1} if the password matches. + +@var{key} contains the zero terminated plaintext password string. + +@var{hashed} contains the zero terminated hashed string to compare with. + +Sample code to verify a bcrypt hash: +@example +char cleartxtpassword[] = "ExamplePassword"; +char existinghashed[] = + "$2y$" /* Hash algorithm version */ + "10" /* 2^10 hash rounds (strength) */ + "$" /* separator */ + "1b2lPgo4XumibnJGN3r3sO" /* base64 encoded 16-byte salt */ + "u7wE7xNfYDKlAxZffJDCJdVfFTAyevu"; /* Hashedpart */ +if (blowfish_bcrypt_verify(cleartxtpassword, existinghashed)) + printf("Password is correct."); +else + printf("Password is incorrect."); +@end example +@end deftypefun + @subsection Camellia @cindex Camellia -- 2.20.1 [View Less]

3 5

Failure of gnutls ci build
by nisse＠lysator.liu.se 03 Apr '20

03 Apr '20

Hi, I committed a change to update nettle version numbers, which implies a new symbol version for internal symbols. That seems to break the gnutls ci build, https://gitlab.com/gnutls/nettle/-/jobs/487360242 The error is 1217 ./bootstrap: getting translations into po/.reference for gnutls... 1218 wget: /lib64/libhogweed.so.5: version `HOGWEED_INTERNAL_5_0' not found (required by /lib64/libgnutls.so.30) 1219 wget: /lib64/libnettle.so.7: version `NETTLE_INTERNAL_7_0' not found (required by /… [View More]

5 9

Nettle 3.5.1 and OS X 10.12 patch
by Jeffrey Walton 01 Apr '20

01 Apr '20

Hi Everyone/Niels, I've got a bare-bones Mac-mini without Xcode. It has CC Tools but that is it. It is in a stock configuration. When I attempt to run 'make check' nearly every test failed due to missing libnettle and libhogweed. The libraries were present in .lib/, but something was blowing away LD_LIBRARY_PATH and DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH. My driver script set it, and the Nettle sources also set it after I set it. But by the times the test runner scripts were run, they were empty again (they were … [View More]

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nettle-bugs April 2020